


THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

1732



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


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February, 1932

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ORGANIZED APRIL 25, 1913, AT GUANTANAMO, CUBA

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OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP—Active membership open to officers of the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve and to former officers of honorable service with annual dues of \$3.00. Associate membership, with annual dues of \$2.00, open to officers of the Army, Navy and Organized Militia and to those in civil life who are interested in the aims of the Association. Honorary members shall be elected by unanimous vote of the Executive Committee.

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CONTRIBUTIONS—The GAZETTE desires articles on any subject of interest to the Marine Corps. Articles accepted will be paid for at the GAZETTE'S authorized rates. Non-members of the Association as well as members may submit articles. In accepting articles for publication, the GAZETTE reserves the right to revise or rearrange articles where necessary.

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Washington, D. C.

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HON. ERNEST LEE JAHNCKE
Assistant Secretary of Navy

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. XVI

FEBRUARY, 1932

No. 4

The United States Marine Corps

By ERNEST LEE JAHNCKE
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy

THE Marine Corps is an organization of men trained as soldiers who are part of the Navy and who go to sea in ships as the Navy does. Though their training is similar to that of the Army their traditions and their administration are those of the Navy. They are the Navy's sea soldiers ready to put to sea, to land on foreign shores and to do whatever may be necessary to carry out one of the Navy's main missions in peace time and to support the sea-going forces of the Navy in war time. Their boast is "The first to fight" and their history has been a continual proof that this boast is not ill-founded.

A brief historical sketch of the Marine Corps cannot possibly contain more than a suggestion of what that body of men, always a part of the Navy, has achieved in war and in peace for the nation. Early in the Revolution the Continental Congress organized a Marine Committee, charged with the duty of founding and administering a navy. This committee provided for the acquisition of ships, for the raising of sufficient officers and men to man them, and for a body of marines to make up the marine guards. During the Revolution marines fought in the battles of our regular Navy at sea as part of the regular crews of these ships; they fought ashore as members of landing parties from ships and as part of expeditionary forces. A battalion of marines served under George Washington at Princeton.

Under the Constitution of 1789 Congress provided for a War Department which was to administer both the Army and the Navy. Soon after the first ships of the permanent Navy were put into commission, it became apparent that one department could not handle the affairs of both services. It was suggested that one super-department be formed with an assistant to take care of each branch, but this plan was discarded and the Navy Department was established by law on April 30, 1798. The marines went without question to the new department. Just previously, the then Secretary of War, James McHenry, had proposed that a regiment of infantry be created with men enlisted for it in the "double capacity of Marines and Infantry" for duty in forts and on board ship. This recommendation was not followed by Congress.

A few months after the law creating the Navy Department was passed, a further law re-creating the Marine Corps was considered and passed. This act (July 11, 1798) provided for the Marine Corps as an integral part of the Navy and further stipulated that care should be taken to appoint and enlist in the corps only men so acquainted with maritime affairs as would enable them efficiently to perform their duties at sea. The fact that the marines were also soldiers, and that all naval affairs were being handled by the

War Department at the time, led to a certain ambiguity in the law in regard to the status of marines when stationed on shore. This uncertainty caused arguments between the War and Navy Departments concerning matters of jurisdiction and the question was carried to Congress. In 1829-1830 Congress considered a proposal to merge the Marine Corps into the infantry and artillery of the Army. That plan failed for the same reason that it had failed before, because the marines at sea were a part of the Navy, and their duties on shore either at home or abroad were more connected with those of the Navy than with those of the Army. At last, in 1834, Congress settled the matter by legislating that the Marine Corps was a part of the Navy, although the President could detach part of it for temporary service with the Army. This law was coded into the Revised Statutes in 1874 and is in effect today.

Thus it can be seen that it is no accident that the Marine Corps forms part of the Navy. Congress gave careful consideration to the matter on several occasions and each time gave the same decision. Common sense and a knowledge that the Navy has need for its navy troops was responsible for the original decision and for the fact that it has never been changed. Consideration of the duties of the marines in peace and in war will show the reason for having this body of troops under the same administrative head with the Navy.

In the first place the marines at sea are a part of the crew of the ship to which they are attached. They take care of the upkeep of certain parts of the ship, they man a part of the battery, and form the guard. When marines are absent from a ship for any reason, these duties are performed by the bluejackets. To perform this work efficiently, these men must be trained with the Navy and be subject to navy methods of discipline, training, and administration. On board ship also the marines form part of the landing force and are especially valuable for this duty because of their training as soldiers. This duty of the marines at sea in ships is the same in peace and in war.

It frequently happens that disorders in unstable countries extend over a wide area and threaten American rights and the forces of law and order. In some such cases the landing forces from ships are unable to cope with the situation and it is necessary to provide a larger force and provide it quickly. The marines on duty in the United States are organized into regiments and larger units which are ready to move at the shortest possible notice, are embarked in navy transports, and are sent to any point where their services may be necessary. As their training has been along naval lines they can do their part with the Navy

with no effort and are perfectly fitted to act in conjunction with it. Aside from these considerations there is another reason for employing marines for this duty. The Secretary of War, the Honorable Patrick J. Hurley, stated very recently:

"The Army is a little different from the Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps can land on foreign territory without it being considered an act of war; when the Army moves on foreign territory that is an act of war. That is one of the reasons for the Marine Corps."

Thus, it can be seen that, in time of peace, the marines form a part of the crews of certain ships of the Navy; they form a valuable part of the landing forces of these ships, and, finally, they can be called upon to furnish a larger and better trained expeditionary force than the Navy alone is able to furnish. These over-seas forces are constantly ready, with the Navy, to uphold the foreign policies of the government and may be called upon to act at any time the Secretary of State so decides. Being part of the Navy and under the same administrative head there is no confusion as to command and administration.

These peace-time activities of the Marine Corps are of great importance but the principal mission of all our armed forces is to conduct war, should it unfortunately overtake us.

The Washington Conference of 1921 on the Limitation of Naval Armaments left in the minds of naval strategists a condition for study peculiar to the maintenance of American sea power. The United States has, relatively speaking, few over-seas fortified naval bases—a marked deficiency in the needs of American naval strategy. The Marine Corps, at present, is maintained as a mobile force of sea soldiers, accustomed to naval life. It has now, if it never had before, its peculiar prime naval mission. It must furnish to the fleet in war, or in advance of war, part of the fleet's tactical organization. It must supply an advance base force of sufficient numbers, so organized and equipped as to seize and hold that base upon which alone the fleet can widen its field, or area, of effective naval control. This work the Marine Corps, as part of the Navy, stands ready now to do more effectively and more economically than can be accomplished by other means.

A consideration of the demands for seizure and defense of these over-sea naval bases has shown the need for aerial scouting and fighting operations. In order to be in a position to meet these demands the Marine Corps has developed its own air force, and aviation has become an important part of training.

There are many other war-time duties for which these sea soldiers are especially fitted. The guarding of navy yards and naval stations at home and at such places as Guantanamo, the Canal Zone, Pearl Harbor, etc., grows naturally out of the peace-time duties of the Corps there. As is well known, a brigade of marines operated with the Army in France during the World War under the provision of law permitting the President to assign them to such duty.

Consideration of some wars of the past shows very conclusively why navies have always required a force of sea soldiers at their disposal, ready to seize and guard advanced bases, to conduct limited campaigns ashore, and undertake other land operations necessary

for the success of the naval forces. During the World War, Admiral Sims might have desired a brigade of marines for use in the Adriatic. Admiral Dewey wished that he might have had such an expeditionary force with him to occupy Manila after the battle on May 1, 1898. Admiral Sampson had the First Marine Battalion land at Guantanamo Bay, drive out the Spanish forces there and guard it while his ships were blockading Admiral Cervera in Santiago. After its capture our ships went regularly to Guantanamo Bay for coal. Had the admiral not had the force immediately available for occupying this bay his problem of maintaining the blockade would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, for he would either have had to use waters far removed from Santiago, or have coaled his ships in the open sea at the beginning of the hurricane season. Later on the Army landed and commenced the attack on Santiago, instead of attempting to reduce the fortifications at the entrance of the harbor. The ideas of the admiral were not the same as those of the Army commanders. He considered the possibility of bringing the marines from Guantanamo to Santiago in order to attack the forts.

To take some examples from recent foreign experience, the British fleet undertook to force the Dardanelles in February and March, 1915. They were successful up to a point, but found it impossible to continue on unless a landing force could be put ashore. Had they had available for immediate use an expeditionary force they could have seized the end of the peninsula with very small losses. At the end of April when the Army came the Turks had gained time to prepare their beaches, and the landing operation was carried out with much greater loss. In 1882 the English fleet made a surprise bombardment of Alexandria, Egypt. The presence of a small expeditionary force to follow up this bombardment when the Egyptian forces were still disorganized would have been of enormous advantage. Many other instances could be cited which show the advantage that can be gained by having such a force available to follow up sudden naval action.

In the past naval expeditions that included a considerable number of marines have frequently been sent to foreign states. For instance, in 1858, Congress directed that a naval expedition be sent to Paraguay. The Marine Corps was increased by 200 to provide sufficient marines for this expedition. Also a very large expedition was sent to Panama in 1885.

Since 1898 the marines, as part of the Navy, have taken part in about thirty-five expeditions to such countries as Cuba, China, Nicaragua, Philippine Islands, United States of Colombia and Panama, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Republic of Haiti, Korea, etc. This does not include landings from naval ships of which there have been about forty-five. They have participated in four of what might be called occupations of foreign states such as Panama in 1903; Cuba in 1906-1909 in conjunction with the Army; Haiti from 1915 to date; and Santo Domingo from 1916 to 1924. They have taken part in about seven minor wars such as the Philippine Insurrection, Samoa in 1899, the Chinese Boxer War, Nicaragua in 1912 and 1926-1931, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. They have guarded American legations at Peking, China (1898-99 and 1905-1931); Seoul, Korea; and Managua, Nicaragua. They have assisted in the supervision of elections in Pan-

ama, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. All these operations have occurred within the geographical jurisdiction of the commanders of naval squadrons and thus the marines and bluejackets are the proper armed forces to employ.

All this work in which the Marine Corps has been engaged has required an increasing number of officers and men. The original establishment in 1798 totalled 848. Since then there has been a steady and conservative growth, keeping pace with the increasing wealth and importance of the nation, until now the strength is about 18,000 officers and men.

There is another feature of the Marine Corps that must not be undervalued. An organization that has its roots back in the Colonial days of 1740-42 and one that has fought in every war of this country has traditions that are of enormous value to the nation. Its "esprit de corps" is well known everywhere and its example is one well worth following. It is an American landmark, one of the nation's foundation stones solidly established on loyalty and duty well performed. It is an asset that cannot be replaced, and as such it should be regarded by the nation.

—From THE TRIDENT, U. S. Naval Academy, December, 1931.

Address by the Honorable Ernest Lee Jahncke

The Assistant Secretary made the following speech before the Aztec Club of 1847 at its Annual Dinner, November 21, 1931:

IT IS a great pleasure, Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Aztec Club of 1847, to join you on this occasion. You, as descendants of those who bore the burden of conflict, keep alive the recollections of a contest unique in American and unparalleled in history's annals—the War with Mexico. You enlighten this generation in memories that should be forever part of America's living consciousness. You keep, as Edmund Burke once expressed it, that "solemn compact between the noble dead, the living and the unborn." In helping to make this generation of Americans, in this relation, proud of our country's past, you deserve the congratulations of all for your zeal and your fidelity to your trust.

In the preparation of the few words with respect to the part played by the Navy in that War with Mexico, I have spent some illuminating hours. It is idle for me here to say that I have ever had the strongest of attachments for our naval service. My native city, New Orleans, owes much to the Navy. I have gathered fresh ground for confidence in the inestimable value to the country of the Navy. That war preserved to the American flag that vast territory first acquired in what was known as the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. The War with Mexico had no war of aggression on our part. That purchase with money could not be sealed except in blood. For the gallant services performed by men of the Army in that consummation, that branch of our National Defense has received the plaudits of the country. The vast territory involved in that purchase, particularly that part known as the Mississippi Valley, has a wealth of natural resources exceeded by no like area on the face of this earth. The War Mexico added to the United States in Texas and in the ceded or disputed territory one million square miles of land, five thousand miles of sea coast and three great harbors. The purchase of 1803 cost us in money the original \$15,000,000 we paid to France. But British diplomacy did not then accept this acquisition. England had other ambitions in the American continent. But British arms at the Battle of New Orleans, fought by Andrew Jackson on the Field of Chalmette, January 8, 1815, failed to sustain British diplomacy. Mind you—the treaty of peace that ended the War of 1812 had been then signed and sealed. It contained a stipulation that

each nation should hold whatever territory it possessed at the date it was to be proclaimed, that date being February 15, 1815. When that treaty was signed the Packenham expedition was en route to American shores. This military movement was expected to put England in actual possession of New Orleans and in control of the Mississippi Valley. Chalmette changed these fond expectations to our glory and to England's mortification. But, in the years that followed, British diplomacy in no sense of the word abandoned ambition to acquire further foothold on the American continent. Mr. Huskisson, in the British House of Commons, said in 1830, that, "England could not suffer the United States to bring under their domination a greater portion of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico than that which they then possessed." Huskisson added, "that the Gulf of Mexico should not become part of the waters of the United States." He concluded his public statement by remarking that "a war arising out of these pretensions of the United States might one day occur." When Texas seceded from Mexico, secured her independence on the battlefield of San Jacinto in 1836 and sought thereafter annexation to the United States, these particular territorial ambitions of Great Britain were frustrated. The annexation of Texas not only brought our flag to the Rio Grande, but opened up the door for the later conflict with Mexico. For nine critical years that question—the annexation of Texas—disturbed the American public. In 1844 a treaty for that object had been rejected by the United States Senate. But, in the political campaign of that year, that issue of annexation, with its possible consequence of war, was submitted to our people. James K. Polk of Tennessee advocated annexation of Texas even with its sequence of war. Henry Clay of Kentucky, his principal opponent, opposed annexation solely because of the war that would surely follow. Both sides agreed, however, that our claim to Texas was just and valid. In November, 1844, Mr. Polk was elected. Joint resolutions authorizing annexation were introduced in the Congress in the winter of 1844. On March 1, 1845, these resolutions passed and were approved by the expiring President, John Tyler of Virginia, when President Polk assumed office, March 4, 1845, he faced war with Mexico, at the vote and by the action of our own people. During these intervening and critical nine

years that followed San Jacinto, an American squadron was maintained in the waters of the Pacific. In the same area there operated a squadron of British vessels of like strength. Both fleets were busily watching each other. The Mexican Government was indebted in a considerable sum to English bondholders. They, remembering that Mexico had lost Texas, were alarmed. England then proposed to the Mexican Government that Mexico mortgage California to Great Britain as security for these debts. It was also proposed that England should come into actual possession of California under an agreement with Mexico. Thus there would have followed sufficient indemnity to the British for their disappointments in Louisiana and Texas. Each of these two squadrons, British and American, operated in the Pacific waters with like ideas. The most important purpose of each was the occupancy of California. The vigilance of each commander was therefore directed toward the movements of the other. Both recognized the fact that war might exist for months before the news reached them even as a rumor. If the British had the first news the opportunity for the acquisition of California would be lost to the American commander. For either commander to act upon rumor meant possibly that a great wrong would be done. For either commander to await for official information might be equally fatal. Commodore Thomas Catesby Jones in this situation had, in 1843, acted upon rumor that war had broken out and had hoisted our flag in California. Because of his imprudent act he had to be relieved from his command. Commodore John D. Sloat assumed command of the squadron and sailed from Honolulu to Mazatlan Mexico, arriving there November 18, 1845. Captain John C. Fremont, then an Army engineer—remembered in history as The Path-Finder—had undertaken in the summer of 1845 a third expedition to California. There was a third leading figure in the drama about to be enacted, the United States Consul at Monterey, Mr. T. O. Larkin. Great events sometimes follow from circumstances with respect to which the public is not informed. On Thursday, October 30, 1845, President Polk made this entry in his private and personal diary:

"I held a confidential conversation with Lieutenant Gillespie, of the Marine Corps, about eight o'clock P.M., on the subject of a secret mission on which he was about to go to California. His secret instructions and the letter to Mr. Larkin, U. S. Consul at Monterey, in the Department of State, will explain the object of his mission."

The documents bearing on this subject show this secret mission of Lieutenant Gillespie was to carry messages from President Polk to the three representatives of the United States on the Pacific Coast—the American Consul at Monterey, the Commander of the U. S. Naval Force, and Captain John C. Fremont of the Army. Stripped to their principal requirements these messages were to the effect that to obtain California for the United States, peaceably if possible, but by force if necessary, was their responsibility—California must not be lost to a foreign power. Sloat was expected to act promptly upon the earliest intelligence he could obtain from his own sources of information. And he was so to act without written evidence of the wishes of the authorities at Washington. And we should not forget that the action Sloat was expected

to take in the anticipated situation was the precise thing that separated his predecessor from his service afloat.

On the walls of the office of the Surgeon General of the Navy at the Navy Department of today, you will see the portrait of William Maxwell Wood, the first Surgeon General of the United States Navy. His name and fame are concerned in the later steps that led to our acquisition of California. Doctor William Maxwell Wood had been the Fleet Surgeon under Commodore Sloat. In the spring of 1846 he was under authority to return home via the interior of Mexico, to sail from one of the ports in the Gulf of Mexico. En route, at Guadalajara, about May 12, 1846, Doctor Wood learned of the outbreak of hostilities on the Rio Grande, April 25, 1846. He acted with promptitude and sent immediately to his former commander, secretly and by courier, this intelligence. It was received by Commodore Sloat at Mazatlan, May 17, 1846. Let the Commodore now relate its significance to him. He wrote to Doctor Wood, March 20, 1855, as follows:

"The information you furnished at Mazatlan from Guadalajara (at the risk of your life) was the only reliable information I received of that event which induced me to proceed directly to California and upon my own responsibility to take possession of that country which I did on the 7th of July, 1846."

The rest of the story is history. The British fleet, ever alert, only learned the truth some days after Commodore Sloat and his squadron had left the Mexican coast. The British promptly sailed to California on the same errand as that of Sloat. They never overtook the American squadron. When the British reached Monterey they found the American flag flying. California formally and actually had come into the possession of the United States, safe from further British designs. What a different story might have been created in history's pages had there been no Gillespie or no William Maxwell Wood. Who knows but that with Great Britain in actual possession of California she would not have absorbed our southwest and made herself the partial, if not the absolute mistress of North America.

The events subsequently occurring on the Pacific Coast as the result of which the acquisition of California was confirmed time does not permit me here to relate. The controversies, charges and countercharges, courtmartials, etc., affecting the chief actors and their adherents in that territory are interesting. To Americans the fact that that part of the Pacific Coast was saved to our flag is important. Just how it happened and to whom the major credit is due are of lesser concern. The parts played by Sloat, Fremont, Larkin, Kearney, Kit Carson, Gillespie and Wood contributed to the final result—there is glory enough for all. But we of this day cannot avoid the thought that if Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the Marines, had not possessed the courage and tenacity of purpose the story of his actions evidenced, and if Commodore John D. Sloat had not reposed in Gillespie that selfsame confidence the leading figures of government at Washington had entrusted in him, the United States of today would not have bordered on the Pacific Ocean.

That attitude displayed toward this representative officer of the Marine Corps was but characteristic of

the wider confidence reposed in all elements of that now renowned Corps by all responsible officers of the Navy and of the Army in the theater of operations of our military and naval forces in the Republic of Mexico. At no previous time in our national history did the Marine Corps render a more conspicuous service to the country than during the Mexican War. They there justified the motto afterwards inscribed on their colors, "From Tripoli to the Halls of the Montezumas." All vessels of the Navy carried their full complement of marines. In some instances, at the request of naval commanders afloat, increases in marines were authorized, the forces of seamen proper being reduced accordingly. A battalion of Marines under Colonel Watson was detached from service with

the Navy and formally assigned as an inherent part of the Army of Invasion under Major General Winfield Scott. Two officers of the Marine Corps of distinguished conduct in the Mexican War—Charles Grimes McCawley and Charles Heywood—later received the highest gift vouchsafed a marine. Each closed his respective career in that office now so conspicuously administered by my distinguished friend, Major General Ben H. Fuller, Commandant of the Marine Corps. While I must here yield to General Fuller in relating in more detail the conspicuous services rendered by his Corps in the War with Mexico, I yield to no one in the extent of my admiration for the United States Marines.

Address by Major General Ben H. Fuller

The Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps delivered the following speech before the Aztec Club of 1847 at its Annual Dinner, November 21, 1931:

IT IS a pleasure, Mr. President, to speak for the Marine Corps in that very friendly atmosphere my worthy friend, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Jahncke, has just created. The exploit of Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie, of the Marine Corps, is familiar to the present day Marine. Gillespie exemplified the words of the Scripture: "Now abideth rank, title and knowledge, but the greatest of these is knowledge, for without knowledge, we are as tinkling brass and sounding cymbals." Though but a lieutenant of marines he had the knowledge those of rank and distant from Washington could not surmise. This recital of his undertaking, however, brings to mind a claim once made by a patriotic son of New Jersey. He had said, "that there were more in number of important battles in the War of the Revolution fought on New Jersey's soil than on that of any other State, Massachusetts included." To this claim a son of Massachusetts promptly responded: "Perhaps we can admit the truth of that statement, but you must not forget that Massachusetts furnished also the poets and historians for that period." Many of the present day marines regret that no writer like Elbert Hubbard lived in the days of the War with Mexico. Had such a person turned his thought and pen to a recital of the Gillespie exploit, a better story than Hubbard's "Message to Garcia" might have been woven about that perilous journey of Gillespie's through Mexico to Commodore Sloat and thence to the shores of California to save that soil to America's flag. Elbert Hubbard in that story said: "The world bestows its big prizes, both in money and honors, for but one thing. That is Initiative. What is Initiative? I'll tell you: It is doing the right thing without being told. But next to doing the thing without being told, is to do it when you are told once." Commodore Sloat had to be told the thing he had to do. Why? Because his predecessor in doing that very thing, but upon incorrect information, lost his command. The days of the Mexican War were the days of wooden ships. Some one has said that these wooden ships were alive with iron men. The great changes that have been wrought in American life not only to an extent have lessened our con-

sciousness of the past, but have brought conditions that make it difficult to re-create commanders of the type of Sloat. It was the very difficulties of those days, lack of communications and accurate information as to important happenings and policies, that bred those iron men, our naval commanders of a century or more ago. They were of the type ready to do upon their own responsibility the needful thing in the country's interest without the protection of an order sustaining them in the complexities that might follow their actions.

The peril of war does not fail to bring the various elements of our National Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, in closer touch with each other. There each have better opportunity than in peace times to learn the superb qualities each arm of the service develops in their respective personnel through their own methods of training. Such a mutual acquaintance in the theater of active operations brings out the merit each possesses and makes merit available for the common good of all. That was a characteristic with respect to the conduct of military operations in the War with Mexico. It is true, as Commodore Jahncke has stated, that everywhere the representatives of the marines were unstintingly favored with the confidence of the responsible military and naval commanders on the ground.

In June, 1847, a battalion of marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel E. Watson, was assigned to the Army of Invasion under General Scott. It debarked at Vera Cruz on August 6, 1847, there serving with the Pennsylvania Volunteers as an infantry brigade. Colonel Watson became that brigade's commander. The second in command of that marine battalion was the lamented Major Levi Twiggs, a great uncle of Brigadier General John Twiggs Myers, my present assistant as Commandant of the Marine Corps. Among the second lieutenants of Watson's marines was Charles Grimes McCawley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps who welcomed me in 1891 as a newly commissioned officer of the marines. He was the father of Brigadier General Charles Laurie McCawley, retired, of the Marine

Corps, a distinguished member of the Aztec Club of 1847.

By September of 1847 the Army of Invasion, under Major General Winfield Scott, had approached the outer defenses of the City of Mexico. The Marine battalion remained part of the volunteer forces commanded by Major General John A. Quitman, United States Volunteers. At a conference called by General Scott on September 11th it was decided to attack Chapultepec and to endeavor to enter the city by the western gate. Chapultepec, fortified by nature and art, was an isolated mound rising 150 feet above the valley. On top of this mound was a large building known as the military school, enclosed by a wall. The mound declined gradually to the west to a cypress grove planted by the Kings of Tenochtitlan and Texoco in the days of their grandeur. In this grove Montezuma once had his house and grounds. In its later defence against the Americans the last descendant of his line was killed. In addition to its natural advantages, Chapultepec was actually garrisoned by upwards of 800 Mexican troops, while in the fortifications proper and other temporary defenses surrounding the castle heavy guns had been mounted. Fully 4,500 Mexican troops were elsewhere assigned to that locality for defensive purposes. Chapultepec was regarded by both Mexicans and Americans as the key to the City of Mexico. General Scott ordered a concentration of his forces before Chapultepec. Santa Anna, ignorant of Scott's intentions, had divided his army. On the 11th and 12th of September the American operations for the most part were confined to an artillery bombardment. On the afternoon of the 12th, Quitman was directed to make a bold reconnoissance covering the grounds and works to the southeast of Chapultepec. He was supported in this movement by the marines under Major Levi Twiggs. General Scott, upon the information so gained, determined to launch two columns of attack on the morning of the 13th. General Quitman was to lead against the southern face of the castle. General Pillow was to attack from the west. Both these columns were to be led by storming parties of selected officers and enlisted men. General Quitman's storming party was composed in part of 120 men selected from various units of the Volunteer division, the command of this outfit being entrusted to Major Twiggs. Ladders, pickaxes, and crows were placed in the hands of another detachment of pioneers under the command of Captain J. G. Reynolds, of the Marine Corps. These storming parties were supported by the battalion of marines under personal command of Lieutenant Colonel Watson, the Brigade Commander. The brave and lamented Major Twiggs was killed on the heights of Chapultepec leading that attack. Let General Quitman now tell the story:

"The storming parties, led by the gallant officers who had volunteered for this desperate service, rushed forward like a resistless tide. The Mexicans behind their batteries and breastworks stood with more than usual firmness. For a short time the contest was hand-to-hand; swords and bayonets were crossed, and rifles clubbed. Resistance, however, was vain against the desperate valor of our brave troops. The batteries and strong works were carried and the ascent of Chapultepec on that side was laid open to an easy conquest. In these works were taken seven pieces of artillery, one thousand muskets, and five hundred and fifty

prisoners, of whom one hundred were officers, among them one general and ten colonels. . . . The command of the storming party from the volunteer division devolved on Captain James Miller, of the Second Pennsylvania Regiment, by the death of its chief, the brave and lamented Twiggs of the Marine Corps, who fell on the first advance at the head of his command."

Immediately after the capture of the fortress, the whole column, under General Quitman, moved directly on the City of Mexico by the Tacubaya Causeway, leading through the Garita Belen into the city. Soiled with dust and smoke, and begrimed with blood, the field officers on foot with the men, they moved on to the charge with banners furled to the music of the roar of cannon and the rattling roll of small arms. The Garita was taken in a charge at full run at twenty minutes past one o'clock P. M.

At break of day of the 14th, a white flag announced the surrender of the enemy's stronghold, the citadel. The division of General Quitman was the first to enter the city. The honor of first entering the palace, also, and of hoisting upon it the national flag, was accorded to this division, with which the battalion of Marines was connected, thus explaining and justifying the motto the Assistant Secretary has referred to as inscribed on the colors of the Corps:

"From Tripoli to the Halls of the Montezumas."

At our training camp in Quantico many years ago there worked one who rendered a great service to the Marine Corps. But he was one whose feet never reached the soil of France. Before the public, and even elsewhere, there was scant credit given him for the great work he accomplished for the Marine Corps. Credit went to others of rank fated to command what he had helped to create. He taught the Marines not the art of fighting, none of the more sturdy accomplishments of the soldier. But without him all the work of others would have gone for naught. He was a builder of morale. He was concerned in the development of our "Esprit de Corps." He was the song leader of Quantico—Gilbert Wilson by name, without rank or title—but one possessed of knowledge of men. Every Marine who went to France passed before his eye. Gilbert Wilson led them only in song. He loved them and they were devoted to him. And after the Marines in France had done so well, Gilbert Wilson was asked what was it that made them, those Marines, such superb soldiers? This master builder of morale at once answered:

"It was the first few words of that song of the Marines—'From the Halls of the Montezumas to the Shores of Tripoli.'"

There, Gilbert Wilson said, is your esprit-de-corps; its foundation is in your history. You have so instilled it by song in the heart of every Marine.

I thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Aztec Club of 1847. To be numbered as one of the friends of your distinguished organization is an honor I appreciate. Let me express my hearty sympathy in the great work you are doing. You, like the Marines, are preservers of the glorious history of American arms. All the skill we Marines may seem to have as soldiers of this day and generation, is due to the circumstance that we endeavor to perpetuate the spirit of our predecessors as exemplified by them in battle. That is why the work of such hereditary patriotic societies as yours is so appealing to me.

Ship to Shore in Amphibious Warfare

By Major Pedro A. del Valle, U. S. M. C.

NO pretense is made as to strategy and higher tactics in this article. The writer merely seeks to focus attention for fifteen minutes upon the technique and minor tactics involved in an operation whose problems may some day be met with in the varied operations of the Corps.

An attack upon a defended shore is a matter so complex when looked upon in its major aspects, that it presents staggering problems. There is, moreover, such paucity of historical example as is not found in anything else in either naval or military tactics. It is believed that a proper way to approach a solution of its great difficulties is to study each phase closely and critically with the others lightly sketched in as a background into which we may fit our picture.

Let us assume that a general situation exists in which two naval powers are at war. In one of the theatres of operations the more remote of the two possesses a base, say upon the Island of "X." We shall call this power Black, and ourselves Blue. Black has

Our special situation develops when the commander of the Blue expeditionary force against "X" decides it is necessary, prior to the attack upon "X," to secure at "Y," an adjacent Black Island, a flying field for his aviation. See Plate 1.

The Island of "Y" possesses features such as are roughly indicated in Plate 11. It is defended by one battalion, half regulars, half local militia. The armament consists of a few fixed mount guns, about 3-inch calibre, and 5,000 yards range, and some ten or twelve machine guns. Air photography has revealed defensive works as indicated in the sketch. The central range of mountains makes traffic routes from north to south into a series of defiles which might easily be defended against a large force by a determined small one.

The flying field is located at Fort Zed, Plate 11, and is the only practicable one on the island. The principal town is "Baracuda" at the head of Baracuda Bay. The roads are two track, improved, and the streams are all easily fordable.

Colonel M (Blue Marines) is en route to the Island of "Y" with his regiment (First Marines) embarked in one transport. A sea-going car ferry is carrying the boats. These consist of eighteen A-type, larger boats of about 125 man capacity, and 53 X-type smaller ones, each capable of carrying one squad in addition to the boat's crew. The ferry is equipped with special skidways aft capable of launching five small boats or two large ones simultaneously. The boats are all armed with machine guns on airplane mounts, and the large ones in addition carry a one-pounder. This convoy is escorted by a destroyer squadron consisting of one leader and three divisions of four destroyers each. Each destroyer squadron contains the equivalent of one battalion of three batteries of four-inch guns.

The commander of the expeditionary forces against "X" has decided that he must begin his operation of the flying field at "Y" by 2200, 28 March, within 24 hours after the possible time of arrival of the "Y" force off Baracuda, which will be at 2200, March 27. His directive to the commander of the "Y" force therefore calls for securing the field at Fort Zed by 2200 March 28.

Colonel M makes his estimate and submits his plan to the commander of the "Y" force. He decides that the time element, the over extended formation of enemy defenses, and the formidable defiles between the north and south coast call for a quick, decisive, concentrated action. His decision might be: "To land on the beaches east and west of Baracuda Point at 0430 (daylight) and seize a beachhead in the vicinity of Fort Zed in order to secure the flying field at that place for use of Blue.

Task organization might be about as follows:

- (a) The Fish Bay Force.
Lieutenant Colonel MA,
First Battalion, First Marines,
Det Beach Party.
- (b) The Baracuda Bay Force.
Lieutenant Colonel MB,




PLATE ONE

superior sea forces, but Blue is nearly 2,000 miles nearer the theatre of operations. Once Black can begin to operate his superior naval forces from the Island of "X" he has secured an enormous advantage over Blue; or at least largely overcome his own great disadvantage of distance. Meantime Blue has sea control of the area and has despatched an expedition to capture the Black base at "X."




PLATE TWO

Second Battalion, First Marines,
Det Beach Party.

- (c) The Reserve Force.
Lieutenant Colonel MC,
Third Battalion, First Marines.
- (d) Shore Party.
Lieutenant Colonel MD,
Dets Regimental Service Co. and Headquarters Co.

The Beachhead; boundaries and objectives as indicated in Plate 11.

The Task assignments:

- (a) Fish Bay Force: To land at 0430 on Fish Point, Baracuda Point and Fish Bay, secure the beachhead line in its zone of action and protect the right flank of the regiment.
- (b) Baracuda Bay Force: To land at 0430 on the north shore of Baracuda Bay, secure the beachhead line in its zone of action and cover the left flank of the regiment.
- (c) Reserve Force: To lie off Baracuda Point under control of the regimental commander

prepared to support the action of either assault unit.

- (d) Shore Party: To assist disembarkation, maintain order, furnish guides, assist in communication and evacuation.
- (e) Naval gunfire support might be given as follows:
0415 to 0425: Heavy shelling of beaches A, B, C, and D, and of Baracuda Point, Fish Point, Shark Point, and East Point. See Plate 11.
0425 to 0435: Fires concentrated on first objective; See Plate IV.
0435 to 0445: Fires to concentrate on Fort Zed and Baracuda village.
0445: Fires to cease and, thereafter to be on call from landing force commander.

Plate III shows diagrammatically the first part of our scheme of ship to shore operations. The transport is making a lee for her starboard gangways, as weather renders operation of the other two gangways dangerous and difficult. The ferry is hove to near the transport, launching its boats with their crews. The destroyer squadron is making anti-submarine screens for the transport area. As soon as small boats are




PLATE THREE

PLATE FIVE

(the boundary between assault companies), and the boats of the leading sub-wave form on a line of bearing. Other subwaves form in rear.

Various means may be employed to assist the boats in aligning themselves so as to get started on approximately the correct course and formation. For example, lighted buoys might be dropped at intervals, as indicated in Plate IV. A naval officer would command each tow of boats and the other coxswains use his boat as a guide, employing whatever formations might be agreed upon in order to assure the best control compatible with open formations necessary in face of enemy fire during the approach to the beach.

We seek to employ an old established tactical formation: Viz., a light skirmish line to strike first, engage the enemy and find his weak spots; a more concentrated force in rear to deliver the punch where the weak spot is found. On shore we should employ a deployment into line or lines of files in our leading or skirmish line. On the water, the smallest boats we have contain each one squad, so we must be content to assault in squad columns with the larger boats following with platoons and companies to build up our strength rapidly wherever a foothold can be secured.

Boat formations, especially in fairly heavy weather, and at night, cannot hope to achieve parade ground precision of formation nor is it believed that such accuracy, admirable as it may be in training or as a spectacle, is at all essential. If each sub-wave strikes the general neighborhood of its part of the shore line at approximately the same time, we have accomplished everything we hope for in ship to shore maneuvers.

Time schedules, such as the one shown on Plate V, would seem to be indispensable in operations of this sort, especially when large bodies of troops are involved. They are simple, easily worked out, and furnish the framework in which boats, ships and troops may function most smoothly. In the confusion attendant upon such occasions the officer in charge of each tow, every coxswain, every platoon leader and every squad leader must know when to be where, or there will be chaos. As in the case of formations, machine like accuracy is neither possible nor essential. But with the information as to time and place accurately set forth in these schedules and diagrams, the commanders of the smallest units should have no difficulty in carrying out their part satisfactorily.

Let us say Corporal John Doe has the Third Squad

in the Second Platoon of Company B. First Battalion, in this problem. His platoon commander has a copy of the diagram and schedule. His platoon is formed on deck, at the forward gangway. He knows when the second boat begins loading and that his men go in X boat No. 37 of the second sub-wave, arriving at the gangway at 2355. He knows his squad boat belongs in the fourth tow, which forms the second sub-wave of his company. He knows the leading boat of that tow contains the platoon leader. That he guides on him. That they expect to land at 0433 at Fish Bay.

Similarly each coxswain of a boat knows exactly what is up, for the officer in charge of the tow has a copy of the schedule and diagram. Things appear different when you are in small boats tossing about on the murky waters. The coxswain and the corporal must know their time and place so accurately that they will function in spite of this and other disadvantages.

In this problem we have two formations in the leading wave. The First Battalion has two companies in assault with the companies in column of platoons. The scheme of maneuver provides for the leading sub-wave to go for Baracuda Point and Fish Point and engage the defenses there in front and rear and neutralize them while the second sub-wave seeks a foothold on Fish Bay beach. The last two platoons of the assault companies come in as a concentrated force to deliver the punch where the going is easiest. The support company will similarly land at the weakest spot found and throw in its strength to build up the battalion beachhead.

The problem of the Second Battalion is slightly different; a broad, even beach front, a shallow objective. It approaches with four platoons in the leading sub-wave, the remaining two platoons of the two assault companies follow in the second sub-wave. The third sub-wave contains the support company with which to exploit the weak points found in the enemy line by our first sub-wave.

In presenting this article the writer feels that the most he can accomplish is to stimulate thought on this subject throughout the Corps. It is to be hoped that officers whose experience or reading have led them to form ideas upon the ship to shore phase of landing operations may present them either through the medium of the Gazette, or else direct to the Marine Corps Schools, whose staff is engaged in a serious effort to solve difficulties of such an operation.



Signal Communication

By CAPTAIN JAMES F. MORIARTY, U. S. M. C.

(Continued from the November, 1931, Issue)

THE Germans put up a counter barrage of trained hawks which were effective in killing a great number of the French birds. In pre-telegraph days news items were flown by bird, from Halifax, N. S., to Boston and Sandy Hook, by the press, in order to reduce the time of publication of European news.

Visual signalling has had its place in communications from time immemorial, and historical incidences of its use are interesting to one who has a desire to be acquainted with the stages of its development. Signal fires seem to be prominent in ancient visual signal history. This system required organization and training. The smoke from the fire during the day was broken into prearranged groups of puffs, each group or combination of groups being a code for a prearranged message. Certain hilltops had to be designated and reconnaissance made of a chain of hilltops if the message were to be sent any distance. 'Homer, writing of the siege of Troy, tells how (1000 B. C.) Achilles' head was crowned with a golden cloud, from which Minerva kindled a shining flame.' "And as when smoke, ascending from a city, reaches the aether from an island afar off, which foes invest, who (pouring out) from their city, contend all day, in hateful fight; but with the setting sun, torches blaze one after another, and the splendor arises, rushing upward, for (their) neighbors to behold, if perchance they may come with ships, as repellers of the war; thus did the flame from the head of Achilles reach the sky." Aeschylus (about B. C. 500) in "Agamemnon" describes how Clytemnestra learned of the capture of Troy (1184 B. C.):

"Hephaestus, sending forth the Idaian fire,
Hither through swift relays of courier flame,
Beacon transmitted beacon. Ida first
To the Hermaean rock on Lemnos' Isle.

Thus in succession, flame awakening flame,
Fulfill'd the order of the fiery course:
The first and last are victors in the race.
Such is the proof, the warrant that I give
Of tidings sent me by my lord from Troy."

During the invasion of Greece by Xerxes the Greeks at Artemisium were in communication with their pickets triremes by "fire signals" and when he (Xerxes) retired to Sardis, his general Mardonius, whom he left in Greece, planned (according to Herodotus) a second entry into Athens, and desired "to inform the King that he (Mardonius) was master of the place," and (Xerxes) at Sardis, by fire signals along the islands, perhaps the old boy wanted to make sure that he could send an S. O. S. for reinforcements if necessary.

Julius Africanus suggested and explains a system, which anti-dates our varied colored signal lights, in which different substances were employed to permit the transmission of news or orders—a part of code similar to, say, a pyrotechnic code, only Julius did not

exactly use pyrotechnics. Polybius designed a plan for telegraphing as far as the eye could reach. His system consisted of five letters on each of five posts. These letters were indicated from top to bottom by torches, one torch meant the first, two the second, etc. Indian fire signals suggested the system of flag signals devised by the then Doctor Albert J. Myer (later Brig. Gen. Myer, Signal Corps, U. S. A.) the organizer and "father" of the U. S. Army Signal Corps and for whom Fort Myer, Va., is named. His system was first put to "work" during the Civil War.

The semaphore is a old friend of the Marines—or rather, it used to be, and, save for a few individuals who take sufficient personal interest in this particular method of communication, it is a lost art.

Well known is the story of how Sergeant Major Quick won his Medal of Honor at Cuzco, Cuba, 14 June 1898 signalling by flag to the Dolphin on three occasions while under heavy fire.

Prior to the seventeenth century signal communication made poor headway, because the telescope was practically unknown, and the eye is exceptional that can distinguish small objects at ten miles. As usual, the exception to the case can be discovered and Cicero mentions a man who could see objects at one hundred and twenty-five miles. This statement is verified by M. Varro who mentions the mans name—Strabo. Both these writers are very much dead and of course cannot be examined as to their statements. However—to continue—three brothers named Chappe were in school in France. Two were in school in one place and one at school several miles away but within visual signalling distance. Claude Chappe devised a system of signalling, to communicate with his other two brothers. This was device consisting of "a horizontal piece of wood, to which was at each end attached a movable wing or arm, * * * he could produce one hundred and ninety-two distinct signals * * *." With some improvements the system was adopted by the French government. Dispatches could be sent from Paris to Lille, a distance of about one hundred and thirty miles in two minutes. The system was extended throughout France and many European governments adopted and applied it. Russia spent millions of dollars installing the system, stations being built every five or six miles. "Twenty seconds was quick time for a single signal to pass from one post to another." Thirteen hundred and twenty persons operated, or were required to operate the line from St. Petersburg to the Prussian frontier. However, judging from other systems which operated under the Czars, about thirteen hundred were probably presidents of the system.

Our forebears of the Revolution signalled by placing a barrel (or keg as the case may be) at the top of a pole, a flag beneath the barrel (or keg) and "a basket suspended from a projecting arm still lower down. The presence or absence on the pole of one or more of these articles, according to a prearranged plan, in-

licated that an expected event had or had not occurred." "The opening of the Erie Canal, October 20, 1825, was communicated, and acknowledged in return, by cannon, placed every eight miles apart from Buffalo to Albany, a distance of three hundred and sixty-four miles, via the canal and Hudson. It took one hour to carry the joyful news to the State Capital." This was, like the beacons which announced the fall of Troy, prearranged—i. e. organization.

Man is ever wont to harness nature and put it to work, and the desire for closer union forced our ancient and honorable ancestors to combine their thinking machinery with observation of nature. The sun rose and set in the days of the ancients about the same as it does today and its rays were reflected equally as well in the past as they are at present. It is quite proper to believe that the dazzling reflection in the eye of some mighty chieftan, resulting from the rays striking some burnished piece of military equipment bade him pause and wonder—perhaps the suggestion of signals came into his mind—and so history relates. Herodotus tells us that certain persons, probably the Alcmaeonids, who desired to see Hippias restored, signalled to the Persians by means of reflection of the sun's rays on a burnished shield. The signal indicated that the home army was absent at Marathon and that the Persians should attack Athens after reaching it via Cape Sunium. History tells us that the shield reflecting the sun's rays was used as an attack signal on land and sea. Gradually, down through the years, this method of communication by reflection of the sun's rays has been passed from one generation to another, with improvements until a combination of mirrors, efficient and portable, has resulted called by such various names as heliograph, helioscope, heliostat and heliotrope. This device was invented by Gravesande about A. D. 1700.

In 1861 the U. S. Coast Survey maintained communication with this instrument up to distances of ninety miles with ease and rapidity. In 1862 it was introduced into the British Navy. Calcium light was used as the source of light at night. During the siege of Paris (1870-1877) calcium light reflection was used at night up to distances of thirty miles. In 1877-1878, during the Jowaki Afridi Campaign the columns of Generals Ross and Key's were in communication with each other by heliograph, the system working so well that it was introduced into the Indian Army on an elaborate scale. The British used this instrument with excellent results in the Afghanistan and Zululand Campaigns. It was used to send messages across the Straits of Gibraltar. This instrument still has its place in military communication and can be operated effectively and efficiently in spite of the fact that some one had decided that it is obsolete. How well this light portable instrument could have been a useful adjunct to patrols operating on the plains of North China under a cloudless sky and with a sun which could furnish reflecting material for communication for days without interruption is only too well known

by the members of the last expedition to that country. The "old timers" in the Marine Corps still speak highly of the heliograph. The younger generation knows nothing about it. This instrument still has its place in Marine Corps signalling equipment for field use and it certainly compares much more favorably with some of the cumbersome radio equipment with which until recently the Marine Corps has been saddled—but more about this later.

The electric telegraph which came to great prominence as a means of military communication during the Civil War was not an invention of S. F. B. Morse. Instead of reaching into the air and grasping something new in the way of fundamental truths and elementary facts, Morse was one of a long line of workers and his device was but an improvement on what went before. Signalling by electricity has a wonderful ancestry, in some cases pathetic, some tragic, but for the most part romantic and marvelous. The complete history of telegraph would require volumes—a few interesting "high spots" will be offered.

About 1720 Gray in England and Dufay in France discovered that certain things have insulating properties. Dufay "gave us the electric wire, the first real big step toward modern electricity" by building "a line a quarter of a mile long of wet thread held up on glass tubes and found it capital to convey the virtue (electricity) from one end to the other." Muschenbroek (born in Leyden in 1692) gave us the condenser, while experimenting with the conductivity of certain substances. A partly filled glass water jar was used in the experiment—so was a co-worker named Cunaeus. The jar containing the water evidently became gloriously charged and the unsuspecting Cunaeus poked his finger at a gun barrel in contact with the jar—what an awakening (about two days later according to all reports). The jar discharged with a terrific crash right through poor old Cunaeus, knocking him down "and out." Cunaeus in a letter to Pere Nollet says "The vessel was not broken" (evidently that was most important) "but the arm and body were affected in a manner more terrible than I can express. In a word, I believe that I was done for." Hence by accident the condenser was discovered and the first good electric shock was delivered. Pere Nollet applied the scheme to two hundred French soldiers joined hand-in-hand and judging from the reaction of the victims, the travel of electricity was instantaneous. It seems that they all jumped together. Franklin's law of Conservation, Priestly's law of attraction, Davy and Arago with their electromagnet laws, Faraday with his laws of magnetic induction and a host of others, trailed down the century behind Dufay's electric wire. The stage was set, orchestra ready, lights were on and the audience expectant and ready. Morse stepped in and started the show. A few telegraphic ideas anticipated those of Morse but were impracticable.



An American Policy

By Brigadier General Dion Williams, U.S.M.C.

IT has been said of the United States that the Government has no enduring and established policies that can survive through the changes wrought by political administrations that change with the varying will of the people as expressed at elections; and yet a careful examination of the history of the country since its establishment over a century and a half ago shows this snap judgment to be wrong. The early settlers in the colonies that were later to form the states of the present nation left the land of their birth and sought freedom in a new and untried land largely to escape the political tyranny and oppression of the rulers of absolute monarchies and in the Declaration of Independence they emphasized this when they laid down the following as the basis for their action:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, drawing their just powers from the consent of the governed."

This conception was the very antithesis of the governmental idea that had for its foundation the principle of "the divine right of kings," and translated into a slogan that was often sounded by the patriots of the early days of our nation, "Equal rights for all," it became one of the basic policies of the Government.

After eight long and perilous years of war following this brave Declaration of Independence from the rule of a king it was natural that the leaders of the new nation should look with suspicion and dread upon anything which tended to infringe upon the equal rights of Man in a land founded upon the above quoted principles, and that they should avoid any tendency that might lead into political connections or alliances with the monarchical governments which represented an idea quite contrary to their own as to Government.

These leaders early saw the danger to our young institution in Government of alliances with the older powers which might lead us into wars for causes which, under our basic Declaration and Constitution, we could not sanction. This idea soon found utterance in the slogan, "Entangling alliances with none," which was repeated many times in the halls of Congress and upon the political rostrums to support the ideas of an absolutely independent country working out its own destiny, according to its own basic principles, without the aid or hindrance of other powers. In these or similar words the early Presidents—Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison, found occasion to warn against entanglements in the meshes of foreign politics and wars that would have seriously threatened the very existence of our new nation, and for more than a century of our life as a separate nation "entangling alliances with none" was a basic policy of our government.

Thus the first period of half a century in the life of the United States produced at least two definite and established ideas which may be properly styled Governmental Policies; viz: "Equal rights for all," and "Entangling alliances with none." As the de-

velopment of the Western Hemisphere proceeded and the countries to the south of us, looking with eager eyes toward the same goal of "Equal rights for all," rebelled against the tyranny of a despotic government and established republics modeled after the United States with the tacit approval and support of that already established republic, a new problem arose.

The fifth President of the United States was James Monroe, who was inaugurated as such on March 4, 1817, and served in the White House for eight years from that date. For more than fifty years he took an active and leading part in the chief political events of the United States from its foundation at the beginning of the Revolution. Born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, but a short distance from the birthplace of George Washington, April 28, 1758, he was but 18 years of age when the call to arms to fight for freedom sounded in 1776, a student in the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg, Virginia, which still lays claim to being the oldest such institution in America. At the first call some four of the professors and two score of the students of this ancient college joined their compatriots from Yale, Harvard and Princeton to fight under General Washington in the Continental Army. With them went James Monroe and his college and fraternity comrade, John Marshall. Monroe was commissioned a lieutenant in the "Third Virginia Regiment of Foot" under Colonel Hugh Mercer. The records show that the advance guard at the Battle of Trenton, December 26, 1776, was gallantly led by Captain William Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe and that the captain was wounded in the wrist and the lieutenant was shot through the shoulder and that both were highly commended by their commanding general. In 1780 he had attained to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was appointed by Governor Thomas Jefferson of Virginia as Military Commissioner from Virginia to the Southern Army in the Carolinas. Later he studied law in Jefferson's office and to the friendship and guidance of that great patriot and President he ascribed his future success. He was made a member of the Virginia Assembly, was a member of the Continental Congress from 1783 to 1786, a member of the Virginia Convention that ratified the Constitution, U. S. Senator from Virginia from 1790 to 1794, U. S. Minister to France from 1794 to 1797, Governor of Virginia, 1799 to 1802, and served as U. S. Minister to France, 1803, and to Spain, 1804, then U. S. Minister to England from 1804 to 1807, associated with Pinkney in negotiating the treaty with England. After this he was again Governor of Virginia in 1811, when he was appointed Secretary of State and Secretary of War in the cabinet of President Madison, taking a leading political part in the prosecution of the War of 1812. Following his service as Secretary of State, he became President in 1817.

This brief sketch of the notable services of James Monroe in the affairs of his country is given to show the preparation which made it possible for him to enunciate a governmental policy of the United States which has outlasted the shifting exigencies of over a century and still exists and persists as the chief

strictly American policy, known to the world as the Monroe Doctrine.

In order to gain any understanding of the origin of the Monroe Doctrine it is necessary to consider the conditions which existed in the Western hemisphere just prior to the date of its pronouncement, December 2, 1823. During a period approximately covered by the two decades prior to this date the colonies of Spain and Portugal in Central and South America had gained independence from the mother countries by a series of bloody revolutions under the leadership of such honored patriots as Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin and had established local constitutional governments. It is worthy of note that General Bolivar once stated that he gained his first conception of what might be done in South America to establish independent government and the republican form that such governments should take from his first visit to the United States, which occurred in 1809, and that in the republics founded through his efforts the constitutions were modeled after that of the United States.

The government and people of the United States openly sympathized with the struggling patriots to the southward and as early as it could be consistently done the government of the United States issued proclamations of neutrality in the wars and recognized the de facto governments as they were established. The people of the United States were satisfied to see their own example followed by the Latin-Americans to the southward and to have the power of European monarchies curbed where it applied to the Americas—North and South. But in Europe other ideas were prevalent and soon found outspoken advocates. The Holy Alliance of Europe, consisting of the Sovereign Governments of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, announced their desire and intention of putting an end to "representative government" in the Latin-Americas and establishing in its stead the former distant control by European monarchies. This caused widespread alarm among the officials and people of the United States, who still viewed with distrust and alarm any attempt that could be construed as a threat to their government or progress.

In addition, in 1821, the Russian Government had sent out a ukase prohibiting the citizens of other nations from navigating or fishing in the waters bordering their possessions in North America (now comprised in the Territory of Alaska) for a distance of one hundred miles from the eastern and western shores of the Russian lands. This practically attempted to make a closed lake of the Bering Sea and to prevent American fishing vessels from plying their trade in what they deemed the open sea. By order of President Monroe the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, immediately notified the Russian Minister in Washington that the United States would contest this action of the Russian government and also "the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent" and that the United States would adhere to the principle that "the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

Here we have two distinct cases of threatened European aggression on the continents of North and South America which, if carried out, would prove inimical to the vital interests of the Republic of the

United States and the neighboring republics to the south.

The threats were real and dangerous in the eyes of the President and his advisers and careful consideration was given by them to the method to be adopted in meeting this threat which promised nothing but endless trouble for the growing Republic of the United States and its friendly neighbors. President Monroe, by reason of his long service as American Minister in several important European countries and his long and active participation in high office at home in the service of his government, was admirably suited to solve the knotty problem, but he did not trust entirely to his own judgment but called for help from the men best fitted to give it. He requested advice from his early preceptor and lifelong friend, Thomas Jefferson, and also from his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, a wise statesman who was later to follow him in the Presidential chair, and also from the Chief Justice, the friend of his college days and comrade in arms during the Revolution, John Marshall, of whom it was said "he knew more about the Constitution than the men who wrote it."

From Thomas Jefferson he received a letter in reply to his request for advice, reading in part as follows:

"The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since the Independence. That made us a nation; this sets the compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening upon us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be **never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.** America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the latter is laboring to become the domicile of Despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of Freedom."

John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, had seen service abroad and had wide experience in the politics of our own country and his advice to President Monroe was on similar lines to that given by Thomas Jefferson. Chief Justice Marshall, who ever advocated adhering strictly to the letter of the Constitution in the conduct of our own national affairs and as well in the management of our diplomatic affairs with other nations, counseled the adoption of a firm stand in accordance with the Constitution and a positive statement that would clearly define that standpoint to the whole world at home and abroad.

In the plain words of Jefferson, supported by the advice of the statesman, John Quincy Adams, and the jurist, John Marshall, two great principles were enunciated for the guidance of America and for the information of foreign nations in regard to their treatment of the American governments; viz: first, the avoidance on the part of the United States of America of entanglements in the politics of the Old World governments ("entangling alliances with none"); and, second, plain notice to these Old World governments that the United States could not tolerate interference on their part with the new governments of the Americas which were struggling to establish themselves and to make the Western hemisphere "that of Freedom."

Supported by such wise counsel, President Mon-

roe, in his Message to Congress dated December 2, 1823, made two distinct pronouncements concerning the policies of the United States government to be followed in future relations with the governments of the European powers. The two pronouncements are quite distinct in the message and are separated by paragraphs relating to other national questions, but taken together they clearly state the policy adopted by the United States at that time concerning the relations with foreign governments in regard to interference by them with the established governments of North and South America.

These two pronouncements of President Monroe have been known to the United States and to the rest of the world as the Monroe Doctrine and they read as follows:

I.

"At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the Minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the Minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by his Imperial Majesty to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

II.

"It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied powers is essentially different in this respect from

that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the Allied powers should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried on the same principle, is a question to which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the Allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distances from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

The President's message which contained the above significant declarations of policy on the part of the United States Government was very favorably re-

ceived by the Congress and by the people of the United States, though they would have been greatly surprised could they have known that these two propositions so stated in simple language would outlive a century of marvelous development for the United States and would at the end of that period be vastly more important to both North and South America than they were at the date of their utterance.

Abroad, in European capitals, the President's message produced some comment, mostly adverse, since it was considered that the United States was by nature a country inferior to the time honored monarchies of Europe and that its President was somewhat bumptious in throwing down the gauntlet and thus openly defying the nations of the Holy Alliance in the prosecution of their declared intentions. Yet it may be noted that it was many years before any attempt was made to test the efficacy of the policy so enunciated by President Monroe.

In Central and South America the pronouncements were received with much satisfaction and the struggling governments saw that they had a powerful friend in the United States to support them in their proper aspirations for self government, a feeling which has persisted to the present day despite some misinterpretations and misapplications of the doctrine which have sometimes clouded its true meaning and aroused suspicions on the part of some smaller nations.

In Europe the message of the President was not received with approval since it directly interfered with the projects of certain powers, for the resubjugation of the Latin-American states but nevertheless it was regarded with the respect that was due it at that date and through the century that followed.

The policy stated in the Monroe Doctrine was primarily one of self defense for the United States since the aspirations of foreign powers to subjugate the Latin-American republics would have seriously threatened the solidarity of the government of the United States; but at the same time the doctrine had a distinct sentimental value for it came less than fifty years after the Revolution in which the North American Colonies fought for freedom from tyrannical government and almost immediately after the states to the southward had conducted a similar struggle for a like freedom, and it served to bind the new states of North and South America together in a common cause giving them common ideals and aspirations.

Much has been written concerning this remarkable doctrine and it has been stretched and distorted by some of the writers to cover conditions and circumstances never dreamed of by its authors and in many cases inimical to the interests it was designed to protect. The peculiar duties of the Marine Corps, which have called it to service in peacetime landings in some of the countries which lie to the south of us in the Western Hemisphere and its occupations of parts of such countries for varying periods for the protection of the lives and properties of our nationals and for the furtherance of the policies of our government, make it most advisable and desirable that the officers of the corps who may be called upon to command Marines engaged in such service should have a definite and clear knowledge of the origin, scope and history of this prominent American policy. Such a knowledge will give a better appreciation of the whole field of Pan-American politics and will prevent the officers

from forming a wrong conception as to the application of the doctrine.

By some writers the Monroe Doctrine is given as the basis for every action of our government which has resulted in intervention or military landing operations upon the soil of other American nations whatever the peculiar circumstances leading to the adoption of such measures. As a matter of fact the Monroe Doctrine has application to but very few of such operations. Its primary purpose, as a reading of Monroe's message will show, was to prevent colonization or occupation of territory in the Americas by the governments of European nations and it originally had no application to any settlement of affairs that might involve two or more such American governments in controversies among themselves, even should such affairs lead to war.

It is true that some have sought to extend the application of the Monroe Doctrine to other than "European" nations, viz: To include Asiatic nations within its prohibitions, and such claims have been supported by the statement that the original declaration plainly referred to Russia among other nations, and that Russia was to a large extent an Asiatic nation as well as an European nation. However that may be, we are chiefly concerned with the originally intended application of the doctrine to the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine referred to future actions of European governments toward "further" colonization of American territory and had no application to territory already occupied by such governments in 1823, such as Canada and certain of the West Indian islands. One of its main objects was to prevent a further extension of such colonization and thus afford a bulwark back of which the new American republics could develop according to their own ideals.

In this connection a quotation from the writings of a most eminent statesman and legal authority on the subject of the application of the Monroe Doctrine may serve to clear the subject. The Chief Justice of the United States, the Honorable Charles Evans Hughes, states in "Our Relations to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere," as follows:

"Confusion has been caused by what appears to be a prevalent notion that the Monroe Doctrine is the justification or excuse for every action that we take in relation to Latin America. We have other policies; they should be explained, criticised or defended upon their merits; they should neither gain nor lose by confounding them with the Monroe Doctrine. For example, we have a definite policy of protecting the Panama Canal. We deem it to be essential to our national safety to hold the control of the Canal and we could not yield to any foreign power the maintaining of any position which would interfere with our right adequately to protect the Canal or would menace its approaches or the freedom of our communications. This applies just as well to American powers as to non-American powers. We have the right to protect American lives and property when endangered in circumstances and areas where governments have ceased properly to function, and this principle is applied although there may be no prospect of non-American interference and no occasion for applying the Monroe Doctrine. We recognize that other states have a similar right. It is true that our interposition in such cases may have the actual and intended effect of avoiding

the interposition of non-American powers and the consequent activities and developments at which the Monroe Doctrine was aimed, but our right to protect our nationals is quite distinct from the Monroe Doctrine."

In the above able exposition of the most common fallacy in the usual public references to the application of the Monroe Doctrine the Marine officer who reads this will recognize the implied reference to several foreign lands where we have served "to protect American lives and property" under the circumstances as stated.

Referring to the application of the Monroe Doctrine as a policy, Chief Justice Hughes further stated:

"The policy embodied in the doctrine is an aid to peace. We have added reason to promote good order and the peaceful settlement of controversies. And it should be remembered that the United States has used its influence to effect such settlements between the American States and non-American powers. The historic instances with respect to Belize, the Bay Islands and the Mosquito Coast, the promotion of the arbitral determination of the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana, which ended a controversy which had existed for the greater part of the nineteenth century, and the disposition of the claims of Germany, Great Britain and Italy against Venezuela, afford familiar illustrations."

Whether or not the pronouncement contained in the message of President Monroe to the Congress in 1823 was the only deciding factor or not, it is a historical fact that the designs of the European nations of the Holy Alliance upon the sovereignty of the newly established republics of South America did not result in any positive action toward their occupation or subjugation and it was generally accepted by the statesmen of America of that date that the "Monroe Doctrine," as it came to be styled, had produced the result desired by its author and his government. Likewise in South America credit was given to President Monroe and his positive action in thus issuing the warning to the European powers to cease interference with the established governments of the Western Hemisphere, and for many years the doctrine was looked upon with great favor in these countries.

From time to time after the date of the pronouncement occasions arose in the relations of the nations of the American continents with the nations of the Old World which called for diplomatic action in accordance with the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, but none of these incidents led to actual hostilities. The most notable occasions of such action on the part of the United States Government were connected with the occupation of Mexico by the troops of Napoleon III, and the operations of the so-called "Emperor" Maximilian (1861-1867), and the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary dispute (1887-1897).

When the United States became involved in the Civil War in 1861 the nations of Europe soon showed their preferences dictated by commercial or political considerations. References to histories of these troublous times show that England, Spain and France were not particularly friendly toward the Federal or Northern side in the war, while the other nations were either carefully neutral or outspoken in favor of the Federal Government, especially Russia. This line-up was probably due more to questions of policy and

politics in Europe than to a definite friendship for one side or the other in the great Civil War.

For many years Mexico had been in a state of war and revolution and refugees from causes that had failed were in Europe seeking help from governments that might be interested in supporting them in Mexico or in collecting debts long overdue. This debt question had an important bearing upon the general policies followed by European nations in the dealings with the new republics of the Americas during much of the last century, and in the case of Mexico the loan of \$750,000 had been made to the government led by General Miramon, which was in the ascendancy for a time. The negotiator of this loan was a Swiss banker named Jecker and in return for the actual money delivered (less his own expenses) the Miramon government turned over to the creditors 6 per cent bonds of a nominal face value of \$15,000,000, the deal being thinly disguised as a conversion. This was in 1860 and the United States was too much occupied with serious internal strife to take an active part in the affairs of Mexico. The creditors secured the support of the French government under Napoleon III, who saw an opportunity to extend his control to the territory of Mexico. After much negotiation, in October, 1861, an agreement was entered into by France, Spain and Great Britain to intervene in Mexico with the declared object of collecting the debts and "the protection of their interests."

The first military expedition was from Spain under command of General Prim and it landed and occupied Vera Cruz in December, 1861, to be followed shortly after by a French army under General Forey. For more than a year these foreign forces conducted operations against the Mexican forces under General Santa Anna (of Mexican War fame) and Porfirio Diaz, an Indian leader of Oaxaca, who was to figure largely in later Mexican history. After occupying most of the important cities of Mexico the leaders of the invaders established a monarchical government known as the Empire of Mexico and the crown was offered to Maximilian of Austria, second son of Archduke Franz Charles and brother of the great Emperor, Franz Joseph, who ruled Austria for sixty-eight years (1848-1916). Maximilian accepted and landed at Vera Cruz in May, 1864. The Mexican opponents to the foreign rule over their country continued their opposition to the government of Maximilian and attempted to obtain the support of the United States Government under President Lincoln. The whole power of the United States Federal Government was engaged in quelling the rebellion of the Southern Confederacy, however, and though the President and the government of the United States openly sympathized with the Mexicans in their struggle for independence it was not possible to offer any military aid until the questions involved in the Civil War were finally disposed of.

After the close of the Civil War strong representations were made to the European powers involved in the occupation of Mexico in accordance with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the decision was made to use military force to assist the Mexican patriots in expelling the invaders. As a result of the strong stand taken by the United States Government in support of the Monroe Doctrine the French troops were withdrawn from Mexico and Maximilian was left

without the necessary military support and his government soon fell. With a few of his followers he attempted to escape from his refuge in Queretaro to the coast but was captured, tried by military court and shot.

The communications addressed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, to the French government under Napoleon III, demanding the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico, cited the Monroe Doctrine as the basis of the action of the United States Government and in strong diplomatic terms threatened active operations in Mexico if such action should prove necessary. The French Government met the demands of the United States Government by withdrawing their troops from Mexico, leaving Maximilian and his followers without support, and thus resulted a notable case in which the Monroe Doctrine was applied with complete success.

It should be remembered that just after the close of the Civil War the United States possessed the most powerful Navy then afloat and an Army thoroughly trained by over four years of hard, active war service, and that the people of the South as well as those of the North were strongly opposed to the occupation of the contiguous territory of Mexico by an European power and much in favor of a decisive application of the Monroe Doctrine to the situation. Without naval supremacy France could not hope to continue her military occupation of Mexico against the active opposition of the United States, and here we have an excellent example of the value of sea power in the prevention of war, and of the urgent need of adequate sea power if strong support of a foreign policy like the Monroe Doctrine is required.

The other leading example of the application of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States in its dealings with a strong European nation had to do with the Venezuelan boundary question between Great Britain and the South American republic of Venezuela from 1886 to 1895, and which for a time threatened war between the United States and Great Britain, hostilities being averted by an agreement to settle the question by arbitration. For many years prior to 1886 the boundary between the Republic of Venezuela and the British Colony of Guiana in South America had been in dispute, but in that year the dispute became active due to the fact that Great Britain claimed an area of 25,000 square miles which gave indications of rich mineral deposits, and after some acrimonious exchange of notes diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off in 1887.

The United States government sought to reach a settlement of the differences by peaceful measures of arbitration, believing that the Monroe Doctrine had a direct application to the case, yet loath to take any steps that would be construed as warlike if quieter means might prevail. The good offices of the United States were offered but the British government under the leadership of Lord Salisbury declined and claimed that the United States was not concerned with the question which was one solely between Venezuela and Great Britain, thus declining to recognize the validity of the Monroe Doctrine in the case, and the dispute continued for several years.

Finally, in 1895, President Cleveland decided to force a settlement by applying the terms of the Monroe Doctrine to the case, using peaceful means if

possible or force if necessary as a last resort. The Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, informed the British government that the United States government "would resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain" and Lord Salisbury replied that the dispute did not concern the United States. In his message to Congress in December, 1895, President Cleveland stated that he "was fully alive to the responsibility incurred" and that "fully realizing all of the consequences that may follow" he recommended that Congress take action to assume the authority for the settlement of the boundary dispute. Congress by joint resolution adopted the President's viewpoint and \$100,000 was made available to pay the expenses of a Boundary Commission to settle the question.

At that date Great Britain "ruled the wave" with the largest and best equipped navy afloat and the small navy of the United States looked feeble beside it, but Congress, backed by the people of the nation, was ready for any course that might be found necessary in support of the great American policy, the Monroe Doctrine, for the maintenance of the integrity of the American national territories. The people of Great Britain did not countenance engaging in war with the United States over a question which could be amicably settled by means of arbitration and the Parliament took action to insure such a solution of the question. In 1897 an agreement was reached between Great Britain and the United States providing for arbitration of the boundary dispute, and in 1899 an arbitration commission sitting in Paris rendered a decision in the case. Incidentally, this decision sustained most of the contentions of Great Britain, but it was accepted by all the governments concerned. The United States action in the case in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine was based upon the principles involved of opposition to forcible annexation of American soil by a non-American nation. When the decision of the case was submitted to a fair tribunal, the United States was equally ready to abide by such judgment.

Some commentators at home and abroad have charged that the action of the President and Congress of the United States was made for political effect only, but the action of the British Parliament, made with the support of the British people, put the matter on quite a different basis, and the final outcome of the question went far to establish the validity of the Monroe Doctrine as an American policy as well as to further the cause of arbitration as a just means of the settlement of international disputes.

Some foreign critics of the policy established by the Monroe Doctrine strongly imply that it is a threat of hostility directed toward the nations of Europe and especially toward the nations who have or formerly had colonial possessions in the Americas. In his annual message to Congress in 1901 President Roosevelt directly answered this criticism in the following words: "It is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less is it intended to give cover to any aggression by one New World power at the expense of any other."

Other critics of the policy resulting from the declarations made by President Monroe in 1823 claim that the United States government has used it as a basis for certain actions that did not come under the terms of the original pronouncement; in other words

that its terms have been modified from time to time to suit the needs of the American nations. Referring to this phase of the subject, Chief Justice Hughes has said: "I may repeat my statement made at the time of the celebration of the Centenary of the Doctrine that in all that has been said or done since the declaration of Monroe it must be regarded as modified in only two particulars. What was said with Europe exclusively in view must be deemed equally applicable to all non-American powers; and the opposition to the extension of colonization was not dependent upon the particular method of securing territory and, at least since the time of President Polk, may be deemed to embrace opposition to acquisition of additional territory through transfer of dominion or sovereignty. Neither of these modifications changes the Doctrine in its essentials and it may be summarized as being opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power."

The above quoted summary of the objects of the Monroe Doctrine, so ably stated by the Chief Justice in "Our Relations to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere," in 1928, shows that the principles of the doctrine do apply to other than European nations, for instance to the nations of the Orient. It also clearly shows that the doctrine does not apply in the cases where one nation on the American continents may encroach upon the sovereignty of another such nation. With such cases involving two nations of the Western Hemisphere in disputes as to the ownership or control of territory wholly within the Americas the Monroe Doctrine has no application, and the actions of the United States in such cases looking toward a peaceful settlement of the differences by arbitrations or otherwise are not taken pursuant to the doctrine.

Furthermore, the action of the United States Government which resulted in the establishment of an American republic in the Island of Cuba in 1898 was not taken under the application of the doctrine since there was here no question of the acquisition of "any additional territory" in the Western Hemisphere by the government of Spain. The *casus belli* in this case came from other sources and the statements sometimes made that "the United States freed Cuba from the rule of Spain in accordance with the dictates of the Monroe Doctrine" is not correct.

However, any attempt at a reconquest by any non-American power of territory which it had once occupied and afterwards lost would be directly contrary to the terms of the Monroe Doctrine whether such loss of territory had occurred before or after the declaration of the doctrine in 1823.

It has been said that the basic reason for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine was a defensive one. Prior to the declaration certain European powers had indicated their intentions to support the claims of Spain against the newly established independent governments in Central and South America, and there were also fears that other European powers would make claims in North America which would be inimical to the interests of the growing republic of the United States. Such actions would have been a serious menace to the welfare and security of the United States as seen by the President and govern-

ment of that day and the action embodied in the Monroe Doctrine was doubtless taken largely on that account. At the same time the doctrine offered an equal protection to the other American states most of which were but newly established and as yet possessed insufficient power to combat a concerted effort of strong European powers against them.

It has long been realized that a close cooperation of the states which occupy the continents of North and South America is very desirable in the furtherance of the commercial, political and cultural relations of these states with each other, and the Monroe Doctrine as originally declared should have been a strong support for such cooperation, since its purpose was to protect the sovereignty of these states and free them from the interference of foreign powers which might seek to exploit them or their territory. While the doctrine is undoubtedly a defensive policy from the standpoint of the United States, it is also designed to assist in the defense of the other American states against the aggression of any non-American power against these states.

As long as the other American states take this view of the doctrine there is nothing in it that could be considered inimical to their political or commercial well-being; but it is unfortunate that some misguided persons in the Pan-American states, both within and without the United States, have charged that the Monroe Doctrine has been used as a "cloak for the defense of policies which lie quite outside of Monroe's declaration," and that such actions have hindered the development of a proper Pan-Americanism. Had such critics carefully read the original declarations of President Monroe and not attempted to read into its paragraphs a meaning which was never intended by its author, they would not have been led into strange errors concerning its application.

Doubtless in the past many acts of the United States in the relations with the other American governments have been construed as emanating from the application of the doctrine by those critics who wished to discredit the United States, and by such misinterpretations of the doctrine, either from ignorance or design, such critics may have attempted to use the doctrine as a cloak for actions with which the Monroe Doctrine has not the slightest connection. On this account it is well for all of the officers who are destined to see service in the other countries of Pan-America to have a thorough understanding of the Monroe Doctrine and of its limitations, responsibilities and applications.

Looking back over the century and more that has elapsed since the courageous statements of James Monroe served notice on the monarchical governments of the Old World that the new republic of the United States would brook no unjust interference with the free American states, we can recall that three American policies have been bravely uttered: (1) "Equal rights for all;" (2) "entangling alliances with none," and (3) "America for the Americans," and that of these the third and last one as interpreted by the Monroe Doctrine has been the most important and the most lasting, and that it has been the great "American policy" not only with reference to the United States, but also with regard to all of the other free states of the Americas, both North and South.

The Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade

Organization and Annual Training, 1931, As Told by the Command and Staff of the Brigade

(Continued from November, 1931, Issue)

THE MOTOR TRANSPORT COMPANY

This organization, newly organized as it is, performed very fine service during camp. The Brigade owns one staff car, two light trucks, and an ambulance, purchased from private funds, which were kept in running condition by the Motor Transport Company; and in addition during the period of camp had as a loan from the Marine Corps two heavy and two light trucks which were also handled by the Motor Transport Company, all repairs being made by the personnel of this company. In proceeding to camp this organization proceeded by road all expenses, subsistence, gasoline, etc., being paid from Brigade funds.

THE BRIGADE BAND

One of the most colorful and most rapidly advancing units is the Brigade Band, an organization of established musicians, built up to a strength of sixty-five pieces in a little over one year.

Whether swinging down Pennsylvania Avenue at the head of one of Washington's greatest pageants or trooping the line in sunset parade, the Brigade Band is in every way a credit to the Marine Corps. The Band also boasts a very excellent concert and dance orchestra.

In addition to its regular military duties at the training camp, they also rendered several excellent concert programs on the boardwalk at Virginia Beach. Like other members of the Brigade the musicians "pay as they go" the instruments belong in ninety per cent of the cases to the individual musicians who also keep them in repair.

At the recent apple blossom festival at Winchester, Virginia, the military band, drum, and bugle corps, competitive classic, the Band won first place and a cash prize for military musical organizations. The organization has weakly rehearsals and is rapidly acquiring a reputation as one of the best bands in the City of Washington.

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The Medical Department of the Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade had its inception at a conference in late November, 1929, at the Navy Building, Room 3012, when the present Brigade Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Staley, gave the assignment of organization to the present Brigade Surgeon of the Sixth Brigade, Lieutenant Commander Don S. Knowlton.

The wording of the assignment was brief and very much to the point, as is typical of Colonel Staley. The order was "You will organize and train the Medical Department of the 20th Marines." Immediately interviews were begun with local physicians and surgeons who might prove to be good timber and as a result by early 1930 applications for commissions were in the hands of the Navy Department and soon three commissions were granted in the Naval Reserve to Lieutenant (jg) Howard H. Strine, Lieutenant (jg) Phillip Caulfield, Lieutenant (jg) Lester M. Lucas, DC. With this as a nucleus to work from plus sev-

eral ex-Navy Hospital Corpsmen, and a few old Marines, a recruiting detail complete with a Medical set-up was established with a finger print section, a record section, a Medical section and a Dental section, in short every facility for recruitment of personnel. The headquarters of the Medical Department was first in the Episcopal Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital, procured through the courtesy of Father C. E. Buck, Superintendent. On recruiting nights the entire Hospital Dispensary was given over to the Medical Department of the 20th Marines, this headquarters was used for several months. The Regimental Surgeon organized a "Flying Squadron" consisting of the entire commissioned Medical personnel and sufficient enlisted personnel to handle records and make several trips into nearby communities in recruiting and contacting possible enlisted material. Among some of the places which the Squadron visited were, Clarendon, Va., Rockville, Md., Alexandria, Va., Brookland, where in the short space of three hours at the Catholic University over forty students were examined, enlisted, records completed and the detail accomplished.

When in the spring of 1930, headquarters were procured at 458 Louisiana Ave., the Commanding Officer of the Regiment assigned the Medical Department permanent quarters on the first deck of the Armory, aft. It was here that in true Navy style the Medical Department first begun to square away the situation. On Sundays and week day evenings decks were swabbed, paint used lavishly, bright work shined, appropriate signs erected with red crosses much in evidence, and soon the unmistakable order of Sick Bay, i.e.: Iodine, Iodoform, began to permeate the entire quarters. The recruiting load picked up immediately and soon one recruiting night a week was not sufficient to handle the burden and two nights soon became necessary and finally just before the 1930 camp three nights were the program to handle the enlistment traffic.

The tables of organization allowed thirty corpsmen, and three medical officers, and one dental officer, at Quantico during the 1930 training period, the Medical Department functioned with one Regimental Surgeon, Lieutenant Commander Don S. Knowlton, one Executive Officer, Lieutenant (jg) Howard H. Strine, one Battalion Surgeon, Lieutenant (jg) Phillip Caulfield, and one Dental Surgeon, Lieutenant (jg) Lester M. Lucas, and twenty-eight enlisted men. The set-up in the field at Quantico in 1930 consisted of one field Dispensary where all minor ailments were treated, for example—sunburn, blistered feet, bruises, cuts, insect bites, etc. A twelve bed field hospital was maintained where all cases considered ill enough to be hospitalized were placed. A complete dental office was maintained by the dental surgeon with field dental equipment, where extractions, temporary fillings, prophylaxis of the mouth, etc., could be done. During the 1930 training season of two weeks at Quantico, this set-up proved conclusively that it could handle the medical load, for in that time over fifteen hundred calls were made in these Headquarters for treatment. No

broken bones, no wounds, and no operative surgical cases were encountered during this tour of duty, which was considered a most satisfactory one from a training standpoint, considering it was the first cruise of a newly organized Medical Department. Plans were immediately made on return to increase to Brigade status.

And in the fall of 1930, when with the 20th Marines as a nucleus, orders from Headquarters were promulgated authorizing a Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade consisting of the 20th Marines and 23rd Marines, the Medical Department was again faced with expansion from one detachment assigned to the 20th Marines to two detachments including both Regiments with the Brigade. The Regimental Surgeon of the 20th Marines was assigned duty as Brigade Surgeon. Lieutenant (jg) Howard H. Strine was promoted from Executive Officer of the Medical Department of the 20th Marines, to Regimental Surgeon of the 20th Marines. And immediately plans were laid to obtain commissioned personnel and enlisted personnel to form the Medical Detachment assigned to the 23rd Marines. Profiting by the experiences of the year before, efforts in this direction progressed much more smoothly, and soon three very capable doctors were commissioned in the Naval Reserve, and an enlisted personnel began to function.

The new Regimental Surgeon of the 23rd Marines was Lieutenant Lyman B. Tibbets, MC., Washington Surgeon, Lieutenant W. Lewis Schafer, MC., Battalion Surgeon, Health Officer in Alexandria, Va., and Lieutenant (jg) A. Victor Cercell, DC., Washington Dentist, and a member of the faculty of Georgetown University.

At this point in the narrative it might be well to mention the type of enlisted personnel that make up the sixty men comprising the medical detachments with the Reserve Brigade. If there be any reason that stands out from all the rest to account for the success of the Medical Department with the Brigade it is because of the unusual idea in Medical Department organization, in that the enlisted men are members of the Fleet Marine Reserve Corps, and the commissioned personnel are members of the Volunteer Naval Reserve. In the sixty men comprising the detachments, there are over seventy per cent who are students in the schools and colleges, in nearby Washington. Twelve of which are students of medicine in the upper classes. Three are students of dentistry, and one is a graduate dentist. A number are in their pre-medical studies, and several are ex-Naval Hospital Corpsmen, with plenty of service, and the noncommissioned officers are old Marines and Army men with campaigns in France, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cuba.

The recruiting season of 1931 was an exceedingly busy one and up to July, 1931, approximately fifteen hundred men had been examined by the Medical Department in the short year and a half of its existence. This outfit having functioned from the start and consistently produced results day by day, week by week, month by month, and now has nearly two years of continuous service back of it.

The medical set-up at Camp Pollard, Virginia Beach, Va., during the 1931 training season was organized as follows:

Brigade Surgeon: Lieutenant Commander Don S. Knowlton.

Regimental Surgeons: Lieutenant Lyman B. Tibbets, Lieutenant (jg) Howard H. Strine.

Battalion Surgeons: Lieutenant William L. Schafer, Lieutenant (jg) Phillip Caulfield.

Dental Surgeons: Lieutenant (jg) Lester M. Lucas, Lieutenant (jg) A. Victor Cercell.

One Field Dispensary and one Field Hospital, one Field Dental unit was assigned to each Regiment with the Brigade. These units connected and correlated by the Medical Department Brigade liaison, and all units connected by field telephone. An ambulance which was designed, built, and paid for by the Sixth Marine Brigade proved a very valuable adjunct for service in the field. One light car which was furnished by a member of the detachment completed the transport assigned to the Medical Department.

As an added feature for the 1931 training season an Ophthalmological Section was added, complete in every detail and equipped to handle all eye injuries and diseases of the eye, infections, foreign bodies, etc. An Ophthalmological case was provided and many expensive eye instruments purchased and paid for by members of the Medical Detachment as a further evidence of the high morale and esprit de corps that characterizes this outfit.

During the 1931 training season the enlisted men have received a most systematic course of training using the Hospital Corps Manual and the Landing Force Manual as a guide in open and extended order. The courtesies and customs of the service and the traditions of the United States Navy. They have received instructions in litter drill, in applying tourniquets, bandaging; lessons in asepsis and giving morphine and anti-tetanic serum; in applying "Thomas" splints; and a thorough drill in artificial respiration, resuscitation. These instructions have been given by lectures and demonstrations and then the men have been actually through these manoeuvres themselves. Instruction in war-fare gases was given by the gas office and proved most instructive.

In the field hospitals, the men have received actual instructions in bed making, handling of patients, giving baths, and enemas, taking temperatures, pulse and respiration, and writing reports. An actual field problem was worked out and completed with much enthusiasm. The men showed a great deal of aptitude and ability in carrying out all phases of the manoeuvres.

For the 1932 training season, plans are being formulated for a mobile field laboratory which will operate with the Brigade, and another ambulance which is greatly needed will be procured and paid for by the organization.

An interesting incident occurred during the Virginai Beach encampment in 1931 which will illustrate plainly the effectiveness of organization of the Medical Department serving with the Brigade. One evening one of the enlisted men came to the Dispensary complaining of a severe pain in his right side, this was at six bells, in less than forty-five minutes the case had been completely gone over by the Medical Staff, a consultation had been held and a diagnosis of acute appendicitis had been made, records completed, the patient placed in the ambulance and the journey began to the Naval Hospital several miles away at Portsmouth. An uneventful trip was made and before two hours had elapsed the patient was operated upon by a very competent Naval Surgeon, and the case has since

made an excellent recovery, and is now back engaged in his regular civil pursuits. The kindly and solicitous way in which this case was handled by the Medical Department in the field made a profound impression upon all those that witnessed it and comments were heard expressing the satisfaction over the dependability and thoroughness with which the health of the entire command was safeguarded.

Plans have been formulated by the Medical Department for the activities of the winter for its personnel and include lectures on medical subjects, gas warfare, etc., demonstrations in the care and treatment of the sick, blackboard talks, moving picture demonstrations through the courtesy of the Naval Medical School in Washington. Recruiting, as usual at the Dispensary at Brigade Headquarters will see "Medical" standing by many nights each week. From the record that the Medical Department has made in the two brief years of its career, it has accepted a challenge that each succeeding year must see a definite progressive, consistent improvement over the preceding, in order to live up to the glorious traditions that have ever clustered about those who have served with the United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy in war and in peace.

THE BRIGADE

The Major General Commandant's letter of commendation, quoted in the first paragraph, emphasizes the fact that General Fuller clearly saw through and beyond the pomp of the sharp, snappy dress parades that go to make any Marine Corps organization a good organization.

The picture presented to the Major General Commandant on the occasion of his inspection of the Sixth Brigade was a long line of well drilled Marines, young, eager, dashing. The centering of thirty-six scarlet and gold silk guidons, emblazoned with the striking rattlesnake of the Revolution. A picture that would make any Marine—regular or reservist—thrill with pride at this new development of Marine Corps forces, this new addition to available Marine Corps expeditionary troops.

But the Major General Commandant saw beyond the picture. He saw "exemplary conduct." Wrote the Mayor of Virginia Beach, where many military organizations have made camp, "The Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade is without a doubt the best mannered, best behaved, most gentlemanly force of soldiers yet to visit our city. We are not missing the fact that the conduct of the men is exemplary in spite of the **absence of Military Police patrols.**"

"Military appearance" and "technical skill," writes General Fuller. "The Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade," commended Brigadier General S. Gardner Waller, the Adjutant General of the State of Virginia, and Commanding General of the Sixty-Ninth Brigade, "is the sharpest, dressiest, most military organization that has yet passed in review at Virginia Beach." Bear in mind that General Waller is not a Marine and that he has inspected National Guards troops from his own State of Virginia at Camp Pollard and is Commander of the Sixty-Ninth Brigade, Virginia National Guard, which organization completed its training at Virginia Beach and left for home as the Sixth Brigade moved in.

"Individual zeal," "spirit of the Marine Corps and of the Naval Service," "best patriotic and military ideals," "hours, days and weeks of preliminary hard

work in recruiting and organizing the Brigade," are phrases used in General Fuller's letter of commendation.

Well he knows that, without drill pay and asking none, officers and men spent night after night in hard work for the honor and glory of the Corps. The Brigade is their "hobby" their "golf club," yea a great part of their life's work. Well General Fuller knows that officers, before they are commissioned in the Sixth Brigade must pass a board of Sixth Brigade field officers who determine whether or not the applicant is "Sixth Brigade officer material," whether he can soldier in the style of the Sixth and pay his way as he soldiers. Well General Fuller knows that after this hurdle has been cleared the officer must also receive the official "Okeh" of the Marine Examining Board at Headquarters of the Marine Corps, and that, with these obstacles overcome, his commission comes through only after he has gone out and **recruited a company.** That is what General Fuller covered with "patriotic and military ideals"—the ideals of service, of sacrifice, of giving for the country and the Corps.

No officer or man in the Sixth Marine Brigade underestimates his position. Quitters and "glory grabbers" are dropped from the rolls in short order. The show comes once each year when all hands pay off on the line true to Lincoln's ultimatum to recalcitrant officers: "Get in line or get OUT!" The personnel of the Sixth Marine Brigade is founded upon a platform of "quality plus quantity, but quality must govern."

All in the Sixth Brigade know that they are in the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, subject to call in case of a national emergency. They know that this will mean speedy transfer into action—true to the dictates of the Corps. They know as well as any regular the full meaning of the motto "Semper Fidelis."

They fairly bubble over with enthusiasm and imagination. They talk of the day when "We'll move up together and show the world we can fight and win like and with regular Marines—die like them if need be."

It is hard to stop an outfit like that from growing. All the "giving" part is on the side of the officer and man. The most scant and meagre equipment sees him turn to with full enthusiasm and a veritable lust for learning.

To them the Sixth Marine Brigade's annual encampment is just what it is called. "intensive military training under field conditions." Parris Island routine **plus** the whole outfit crying for more.

Three hundred and sixty-five days of hard recruiting in the background, two nights a week at the armory. No drill pay even hinted at. Then the "show down," piling off of a train in pitch darkness, knee deep in mud that had accumulated over a week's rain, a driving, blinding rain storm. Flop! Some hapless recruit slides into the mud and lets out a yelp, "Heluva place to unload us!" Reply from the darkness, "Be a Marine, you're lucky you're not under fire."

Two weeks of arduous training and then home. The final growl, "It was darned tough but if we'd had another two weeks we'd really **learned** something!"

You can't take it away from an outfit like that and, some day, they hope they'll have a chance to show the Marine Corps in particular and the cockeyed world in general that as Marines "they don't mean maybe."

La Flor Engagement

By

**CAPTAIN
VICTOR F. BEASDALE,
U.S.M.C.**



Captain Victor F. Beasdale, U.S.M.C., on the Trail in Northern Nicaragua, 1927

THIS action was fought on May 13 and 14, 1928, near the finca and logging camp of LA FLOR, in Nueva Segovia, Northern Nicaragua. On account of the location it was so named in the Guardia Nacional reports though it has been referred to also as the "Hunter Contact," the "Pena Blanca Action," and the "Bocaycito River Engagement," as it occurred in wild jungle and mountainous country. It was a meeting engagement between a Marine-Guardia Combat Patrol, commanded by Captain Robert S. Hunter, U.S.M.C., and a large force of Nicaraguan bandits commanded by General Jiron, Sandino's Chief of Staff.

The nature of the engagement and its results were such as to make it interesting for study by Marines interested in the much discussed subject of Bush Warfare.

Sandino and his bandit forces had been forced to abandon the Chipote area in Nueva Segovia because of the activity of the troops of the United States Marine Corps and Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and to seek a "rest area" in the Cua region. He withdrew to this "rest area" and established his main camps at Garrrobo and Gulkes Camp.

About May 12, 1928, he received information that Captain Hunter's combat patrol was approaching the Cua area and, not wishing to have his "rest area" discovered and penetrated, sent a force (probably mounted under Jiron and another under Sanchez to engage it and destroy it or drive it back. The Jiron and Sanchez units, which totaled about 125 men, marched together but the command was divided. These units were guided by friendly or intimidated natives and, marching toward Captain Hunter's patrol, engaged it on May 13th and 14th, killing two and wounding two of its members, and caused the Marine-Guardia patrol to withdraw.

The bandits had disappeared from their old haunts in the Chipote area and it was desirable that they be located. Information had been received which indicated that they might be in the Cua area and to investigate this information, the Commanding Officer of Marines in the State of Nueva Segovia directed that a combat patrol be sent from the Quilali garrison toward the Cua area to reconnoiter and make contact if possible.

Several other patrols were sent out from other stations with missions somewhat similar. Captain H. H. Phipps, U.S.M.C., was in the field with a patrol from Matagalpa and Lieutenant David Claude had another out from Corinto Finca.

The combat patrol we are concerned with in this article was formed in Quilali, Nueva Segovia, on May 8th and on May 9th cleared Quilali to march on the Cua area with the mission to reconnoiter that area and to make contact with the bandits, and was composed as follows:

U. S. Marine Corps—Captain Robert S. Hunter, U.S.M.C., Commanding Patrol; Second Lieutenant Earl S. Piper, U.S.M.C., second in command; 25 enlisted Marines, formed into three squads, and 1 hospital corpsman, U. S. N.

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua—Cadet Ollie R. Blackburn, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (gunnery sergeant, U.S.M.C.), commanding Guardia, and 9 enlisted Guardias, formed into one squad.

Animals, Pack Train and Supplies—Thirty-eight riding mules which mounted the entire patrol, 11 pack mules and 10 days' rations.

The three officers and the platoon sergeant were armed with .45 Colt automatics. Each carried three filled magazines.

Each of the three squads of Marines were armed as follows: One man with a Browning automatic rifle and a belt and Browning automatic rifle shoulder bandolier of ammunition; one man with a Thompson sub-machine gun and three 20-round box magazines and two 50-round drums; one man with a Springfield rifle, rifle grenade discharger, 10 rifle grenades and a belt of ammunition; one man with a Springfield rifle, 2 hand grenades and a belt of ammunition; four men armed with Springfield rifles and belts of ammunition. Three of these carried two extra bandoliers of ammunition and one was the assistant Browning automatic rifle man and carried a shoulder bandolier for the Browning automatic rifle.

The nine enlisted Guardias were armed as follows: One had a Thompson sub-machine gun; eight had

Krag rifles with belts of ammunition and an extra bandolier per man.

Marine Officers—Captain Hunter. Fifteen years of enlisted and commissioned service in the Marine Corps. A major during the World War. Served five years in the Dominican Republic, West Indies, much of it in the field. Participated in an engagement with bandits at Magarin, Seibo Province, Dominican Republic. Graduated from the Company Officers' Course at the Marine Corps Schools, Commanded 47th Company (mounted) Marines for several months in the field in Nicaragua.

First Lieutenant Piper. Graduate from U. S. Naval Academy in June, 1927. Commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the U. S. Marine Corps in June, 1927. Graduated from Basic Course of Marine Corps Schools. Commanded a platoon of the 47th Company (mounted) Marines for several months in the field in Nicaragua.

Marine Enlisted—The enlisted Marines were members of Lieutenant Piper's platoon of the 47th Company (mounted), 11th Regiment. They were chiefly recruits with less than one year's service. The platoon, as part of the 47th Company, landed in Nicaragua in January, 1928, and received one month's training in Managua and Matagalpa prior to taking the field. Lieutenant Piper had schooled his men in their respective weapons. The training in Browning automatic rifles, Thompsons, and hand and rifle grenades had been particularly thorough for the limited time allotted. He had a few small tactical problems on the trails in the vicinity of Matagalpa in which the platoon simulated that it had been ambushed.

About February 15th, the 47th Company, as part of Major Rockey's mounted column, took the field in an active campaign against the bandits. Captain Hunter took command of the 47th Company about March 1st. The company operated in the mountains and jungles for two months and on February 18th took over the garrison at Quilali. On April 1st, 1928, the company had a taste of hostile fire in a contact at Santa Cruz in which one bandit was killed.

From February 18th to March 9th, the date Lieutenant Piper's platoon departed on the mission set forth in this article, Captain Hunter's company engaged in active patrolling in the Quilali area.

The most remarkable thing about the patrol is that the Marine element of it was composed of a platoon that had remained intact for five months under the same platoon commander.

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua—The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua is the military and police force of Nicaragua. The organization of it under officers of the U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Navy (Medical Corps) started in May, 1927. Its organization, in a general way, is similar to that of the infantry and mounted infantry units of Marines in Nicaragua. In 1928 its officers were officers and non-commissioned officers of the U. S. Marine Corps and U. S. Navy (Medical). The enlisted personnel was recruited from young Nicaraguans with no prior military training.

Guardia Officer—Cadet Blackburn was a gunnery sergeant in the Marine Corps and had been detailed to serve as an officer in the Guardia. Blackburn had

fought with the marines in the battle of Ocotol in Nicaragua in July, 1927, and after the battle was highly commended by his commanding officer for his display of courage, aggressiveness, and combat efficiency demonstrated during the eighteen hours of fighting. Blackburn joined the Guardia about May 1, 1928, and had reported for duty with the Guardia at Quilali only a few days before leaving with Captain Hunter's patrol. He could speak only a few words of Spanish and knew very little about handling Guardias. His men did not know him.

Guardia Enlisted—The nine enlisted Guardias were a poor choice for the patrol. They were from the Quilali garrison and, with one exception, were the poorest men of the garrison. The good men of the garrison had been exhausted on previous patrolling. Indications are that they had been promised transfers from the zone of hostilities to peaceful areas and were dissatisfied because this had not been done.

Bandits—The bandits were chiefly men who had participated in the 1926-27 revolution in Nicaragua and some in previous revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras and had been in the field for ten months against the Marines and Guardias. They seem to have been well armed and plentifully supplied with ammunition, and well clothed, some being in khaki.

Bandit Leaders—Sandino, the bandit leader, and the one who sent the Jiron-Sanchez column out to engage Captain Hunter's patrol, is an example of a man creating a place for himself and making himself essential to others. Sandino has little military ability, but to the bandits of Nicaragua, and many other people throughout the world, including some in the United States, he represents a cause. The author has never been able to determine just what Sandino's cause is. He changes it at times to suit changing situations. In May, 1927, he said that he would lay down his arms if the Marines would throw the Nicaraguan President and other Nicaraguan officials out of office and set up a military government. Today Sandino would probably be satisfied if the Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua, the Guardia disbanded, and the country turned over to him and his bandits. But the thing to remember is that Sandino is the bandit leader who represents a cause to which all criminals of Nicaragua can subscribe and thereafter go forth and loot, rape, and murder Nicaraguans with the feeling that they are doing it for the cause. This probably makes their criminal acts less disagreeable to them. A cause is always a help. Fortunately, in the United States our criminals have not yet developed a cause that gives them a commendable standing with some people that are not criminals. In this respect our United States bandits are more backward than the Nicaraguan bandits.

General Jiron—Sandino's chief of staff, seems to have been a high type guerrilla officer, probably the most able that ever served under Sandino. He was a citizen of Guatemala and had been a governor of a state in that country and was considered an able soldier as he had served many years as a soldier of fortune in various Central American revolutions. He was influenced by the Sandino propaganda that was quite active throughout Central America and believing Sandino had a just cause, and looking for work of

a military nature, he went to Nicaragua and joined him.

Colonel Sanchez—An aggressive, courageous, and fairly able guerrilla leader. He commanded the bandits that engaged the Nueva Segovia Expedition at San Fernando and Apali Hacienda during July, 1927. His origin seems to be obscure. Some say he was from Honduras, where he was known as a "bad man" and a "killer."

March Formation of the Patrol—The normal march formation of the patrol on the trail was as follows:

All personnel and animals in a column of files. All personnel was mounted on mules.

The point, consisting of one corporal and four privates, marched with a twenty yards distance between men and preceded the main body by twenty yards. Captain Hunter marched with the point, generally between the second and third men, and assumed active charge of the point.

The main body, under Lieutenant Piper, followed the point at twenty yards. Lieutenant Piper marched at the head of it and the patrol sergeant marched at the rear. There was one mule length between men.

The pack train was the last element in the main body.

The rear guard alternated daily between the Marines and the Guardias. On the Marine day the rear guard was composed of one sergeant and four privates, and on the Guardia day of one officer and nine enlisted.

The rear guard followed the main body at the distance of one mule length and maintained one mule length distance between men.

On the day the Guardia were not marching as rear guard they handled the pack animals on the trail.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 9, 1928

The patrol cleared Quilali at 8:30 A.M. and marched on Santa Cruz and the Coco River en route to the Cua area. The weather and the trails were excellent.

The author now quotes from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report": "Arrived Santa Cruz 1:30 P.M., and made camp. Five Guardia were put on outpost about 150 yards northeast of camp. About 7:00 P.M. firing was heard from this outpost. Upon being investigated the Guardias said they had fired at five men mounted, coming down the trail. No evidence was found and report was unverified."

The above incident is typical of many that happened in Nicaragua. Here we have an outpost of five Guardia with five unsuspecting mounted bandits coming toward them. The outpost got excited or frightened and opened fire at an impossible range, hit none, drove the bandits into flight, and exposed their own presence and that of their unit. Had these Guardia had confidence in themselves, hidden in the jungle, allowed the bandits to ride up to them and then covered them with their weapons so that the bandits would have their choice of surrendering or dying, they would have contributed something to help Nicaragua.

An outpost of Marines, established by Lieutenant Hannekin, U.S.M.C., captured General Jiron, a prize catch, by observing him first, taking cover, and then leaping out on him and covering him with their weapons.

There are two principal reasons why men open

fire hastily; either they get excited or they overestimate their ability to hit.

Men must be taught to realize that 100 yards is the maximum battlefield range at which the average man armed with a shoulder weapon can deliberately aim and hit a man on the other side. Even then the target must be motionless, large and distinct, with excellent visibility.

Readers unacquainted with battlefield shooting may wonder if I mean to say 100 yards. I will qualify that statement by saying that occasionally a man deliberately shoots at an enemy at a range of over 100 yards, but for every such hit there are ten misses.

Some men can be taught to hit small, indistinct, moving targets at unknown ranges; but not by shooting for record on a rifle range. Marines training for bush warfare should fire a sniper's course.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 10, 1928

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report": "Cleared Santa Cruz 7:30 A.M., May 10, and marched in general northeast direction. Crossed high range of bare mountains and traveled through heavy bamboo brakes, trails good. Many houses along trail were burned. Reached Cua River about 2:30 P.M., having traveled twelve miles from Santa Cruz. Trails were investigated mile up river and camp made in immediate vicinity on river bank. At 6:00 P.M., while several of our men were bathing in river, a native dugout was seen coming close to our camp. Upon seeing men in river, dugout was hastily beached and natives ran into bushes on opposite bank, both carrying rifles. Shots were fired at them, and a short chase given but they escaped. The dugout contained native food which being warm had just been prepared and the men were evidently making a journey some distance downstream. At 8:00 P.M. Marine on guard 100 yards upstream from camp fired two shots saying a man had appeared in trail ahead of him. No evidences were found to verify this report. These two incidents caused us to believe that we were in vicinity of bandits."

The houses referred to above as being burned had been burned in earlier operations by the bandits.

Here we again see the patrol allowing bandits to escape from them. These escapes robbed the patrol of valuable sources of information and furnished it to the bandits. The above contacts served to warn Sandino that his "rest area" was being approached. Undoubtedly he had many warnings from other sources. Dashing to Sandino with valuable information is the easiest way for a peacefully inclined native to gain favor with the bandits. He may hate the bandits, but he and his family must live among them and he has his choice of letting the bandits feel that he is with them or against them. If he is known to the bandits as a bandit sympathizer, he is reasonably safe. If he is known to them as a dangerous enemy, one who assists the Marines and Guardia, he is in a dangerous position and had better quit the country if he loves his family or values his life.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 11, 1928

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report": "Cleared camp 7:30 A.M., May 11, and marched up Cua River to junction of Cua and Guasineros Rivers. Followed upstream for distance of about five miles.

The immediate vicinity is known as 'Finca de Cua.' There is a native hacienda about twelve miles up Cua River and four miles southwest of its banks which owner said was known as 'Finca de Cua.' Everything here appeared peaceful and there was nothing to arouse suspicion. They said bandits had passed through this territory eight days previous. Made camp that night on Guasineros River about five miles from its junction with the Cua."

INCIDENTS OF MAY 12, 1928

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report": "Cleared camp May 12th at 7:00 A.M., traveling east until we struck Cua River and then followed trail paralleling river upstream. Weather and trails good. During morning crossed bare, rocky hills and in afternoon crossed heavily wooded mountains. Made camp 2:00 P.M. at La Flor, belonging to Guadalupe Zelaya, this finca evidently being a deserted logging camp and located on bank of Cua River about seventeen miles from its mouth. About 11:00 P.M. the Marine on guard close to camp fired several shots at what he said was a moving light about 100 yards to south of camp. Next morning blood was found along trail verifying in part his statement."

The "La Flor" referred to above is the origin of the name given to the meeting engagement described in this article.

"La Flor," which is a farm and was at times a logging camp, included a substantial house. Prior to the Revolution of 1926-27 and the present bandit war much mahogany was cut in this area for export. United States interests were chiefly concerned in the mahogany trade.

We again see a Marine driving away a possible source of information. The fact that the target shot at was carrying a light shows that he did not suspect the presence of the patrol. How much better it would have been to have captured the bearer, or have engaged the group of bandits at close quarters if the light happened to belong to such. But much patient training in "Scouting and Patrolling" is necessary to qualify men for a job of this nature.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 13, 1928

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report": "Cleared camp May 13, at 7:00 A.M., marching to southeast. Traveled until noon over good trails which crossed heavily timbered range of mountains. Passed several houses, some of which were occupied by apparently friendly natives. Others had evidently been deserted in a hurry. At noon reached Bocaycito River, said by natives to be approximately twenty miles from its mouth on the Coco River. This river, like the Cua, runs to the southwest, and is about the same size. Followed trail paralleling Bocaycito River downstream. Several more houses were passed, mostly containing apparently friendly natives, this territory being more thickly populated than any we had yet passed through. At 3:40 P.M., after traveling through heavy timber and underbrush over good trails, reached scene of combat."

All inhabitants interviewed prior to the engagement gave the patrol no information that would indicate the presence of bandits.

Lieutenant Piper's geographical descriptions given in his "Patrol Report" as quoted above may confuse


the reader. For example, he states that the Cua River flows to the southwest and it undoubtedly does in this particular locality that he was speaking about, but its general direction of flow is northwest.

We now come to the engagement that we have been leading up to and the author will endeavor to describe how this engagement was fought with the idea of enabling the reader to profit by it.

The engagement lasted two days and was divided into two distinct parts. Each day will be covered separately.

LA FLOR ENGAGEMENT ON MAY 13 (See Sketch Map No. 1.)

At 3:40 P.M. the patrol, marching north on the Bocaycito trail, reached the crest of a well wooded hill, known in this article as Casa Hill which was heavily wooded except for a small clearing around a house, and the Bocaycito trail itself, which was cleared to a width about twenty feet. As the point passed the house, which was on the crest and the only house on the hill, Captain Hunter questioned a man and several women that were in the house, and then ordered the patrol to proceed. The point, following the trail, descended the north slope of Casa Hill into Tres Ravine, and on reaching a point about half-way down to the bottom it was lightly fired upon by several rifles from the dense jungle to its right and from the



MAP NO. 1. LA FLOR ENGAGEMENT

All terrain heavy timber and jungle except in vicinity of house and the Trail which was 20 feet wide.

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1) Point, 5 Marines. | (6) Main body and rear point, |
| (3) 30 Bandits. | 15 Marines and 10 Guardia. |
| (4) 25 Bandits. | (7) 40 Bandits. |
| (5) 5 Marines. | |

bottom of the ravine. The point dismounted, abandoned or tied their mules (Captain Hunter tied his), and, while returning the fire, fell back toward the main body to a position about thirty yards in rear of the military crest, where the point formed a firing line facing Tres Ravine (See [1] on Map I.), and continued their firing until enemy firing in Tres Ravine was silenced. By taking up position in rear of the military crest part of Tres Ravine was defiladed, but undoubtedly Captain Hunter's thought at the time was to fall back on the main body to avoid being cut off. It is questionable whether anyone in the point was concerned with taking a position on the military crest so as to command the entire ravine.

When the point was fired upon, the main body, which was on the geographical crest, dismounted and prepared to defend itself in the Bocaycito Trail. (See [6] on Map I.). The trail was clear for about a width of twenty feet, but beyond that on each side was dense jungle and the maximum visibility in the jungle was about twenty feet.

A minute or so after the point had been fired upon, the main body was lightly fired upon by rifle men and bombers from the dense jungle that lies between the Bocaycito Trail and the Hidden Trail on the east side of the Bocaycito Trail (See [4] on Map I.). The patrol took up a position in the trail on the edge of the jungle (See [6] on Map I.), and engaged the bandits at (4). The frontage of the bandits' position equaled that of the Marines, but the bandits were not visible to the Marines. The Guardia were the rear guard and do not seem to have been very active in the fire fight. At 3:55 P.M., after a fire fight lasting about ten minutes, all bandit fire was silenced, and it seems to have been assumed by the patrol that the bandits had fled. No scouts were sent out to reconnoiter and to take possession of the terrain apparently abandoned by the enemy, or for purposes of protection.

Captain Hunter and Corporal Williamson came back to the main body at (6) from the point's position at (1), and Captain Hunter ordered a reconnaissance made of the terrain in the vicinity of the house on Casa Hill. Later during the battle the house was destroyed.

The bandit fire remained silenced for about five minutes, then they opened up on the point's position at (1) with a heavy volume of rifle and Thompson sub-machine gun fire from (3) in Tres Ravine and (7) on Uno Hill. The bandit position at (3) in Tres Ravine was about 150 yards north of the point's position and that at (7) on Uno Hill about 300 yards northwest. They seemed to have about 60 men at (3) in Tres Ravine with at least one Thompson sub-machine gun, and 40 men at (7) on Uno Hill. The point at (1) called for reinforcements and Lieutenant Piper and three men, followed soon thereafter by Captain Hunter and Corporal Williamson, went forward and built up the point's firing line at (1). While standing behind a tree and firing a rifle at the bandits, Lieutenant Piper saw several bandits leading away the mules that the point had abandoned in Tres Ravine when initially fired upon. Lieutenant Piper notified Captain Hunter and Captain Hunter, Lieutenant Piper, and six men ran forward about thirty-five yards to the military crest, from where they could take cover, and not have the bandits capturing their mules defiladed. When this group of eight men ran forward they ex-

posed themselves and were subjected to a heavy volume of well directed Thompson sub-machine gun fire and rifle fire from the 60 bandits in Tres Ravine. Corporal Williamson, a Thompson sub-machine gun man, while running forward was killed by a Thompson sub-machine gun fired from Tres Ravine at a range of seventy-five yards. Hospital Corpsman Young, who generally accompanied the point, picked up Williamson's Thompson but could not fire it as he was not acquainted with the weapon. Captain Hunter checked up on the armament of the men that occupied the military crest and found that there were no automatic weapons there and knowing the immediate need of them to reduce the enemy superiority of fire, he ran back to Williamson's body and got his Thompson from Young who was still trying to fire it, on his way back to the military crest stopped and, in a standing position, fired into the bandits and felled two of them but in turn was shot in the chest by a bandit Thompson at a range of 50 yards. Although seriously wounded Hunter got up and continued toward the firing line and was shot down with another Thompson bullet which hit him in the shoulder. Hospital Corpsman Young then dragged him to cover and dressed his wounds. Some other Marine got Williamson's Thompson into action. About this time Private DuBois received a flesh wound in the shoulder from a bandit rifle in Tres Ravine at a range of 75 yards. When he was hit he was in a prone position but exposed to observation.

The main body at (6) kept the bandits to its front at (4) engaged. These bandits threw several dynamite bombs among the Marines who in turn threw several hand grenades into the jungle occupied by the bandits. The dynamite bombs consisted of dynamite in a bullhide bag and, due to the fact that they contained no metal fragments to inflict casualties, they were only dangerous when they landed so close that the concussion could injure or kill. Several Marines received scratches from dirt and stones thrown against them by the exploding dynamite and several were severely shaken by the concussion but the bandit bombs do not seem to have affected the morale of the main body after it was discovered that the bombs contained no dangerous metal fragments.

The Guardia were in the rear guard of the column and do not seem to have been active in the engagement. They probably remembered their rear guard mission and stayed on the extreme right of the main body when it formed a firing line facing the east and, as the bandits' position did not extend sufficient to engage them, they probably had little to do.

At 4:30 p. m. all bandit fire was silenced and the bandits evidently fell back some distance from their position at (7) (3) (4). Lieutenant Piper, now in command, made preparations to spend the night on Casa Hill. He brought his men in from their positions at (1) (5) (6) and prepared camp on the crest in the vicinity of the ruins of the house. The dead, wounded, and animals were brought in.

Knowing he was facing a numerically superior force that might attack him, Lieutenant Piper made camp for the night in such a manner that he could repel an attack from any direction. He distributed his men over a position that encircled the hilltop. The circular position was about 75 yards in diameter and the men were in pairs in fox holes that were about

fifteen yards apart. The plan was that one man should be awake and on the alert while the other slept. The foxholes occupied by the pairs of men were chiefly natural depressions in the ground with some additional cover placed in front. Entrenching tools were scarce. The wounded, supplies, and some of the animals were placed inside the circle. Some of the mules were tied to trees and bushes near the outside of the circle but so they could be protected by the men in the fox holes. There was no field of fire in the dense jungle that surrounded the position. At 11:25 p.m. Corporal Williamson was buried. The night was a trying one. Lieutenant Piper felt that he was surrounded and that the bandits had ambushes laid in both directions on the Bocaycito Trail and he expected to be attacked during the night, and if not attacked during the night had cause for concern about the enemy that would face him at daylight. The patrol's only water was the little they had in their canteens when the battle started at 3:40 p.m. and much of this was needed to dress wounds.

Two men were sent to the Dry Stream bed during the night but though they reached it unmolested they were unable to find water. (Hence the name.) It was too dangerous to send men to Small Stream.

During the day's combat the bandits did no yelling or cheering.

Lieutenant Piper and his non-commissioned officers cautioned all men about the conservation of their ammunition and grenades and their situation was so obvious that ammunition was expended sparingly.

LOSSES SUFFERED DURING COMBAT ON MAY 13TH

Marine Corps—1 killed (Corporal Williamson); 1 wounded, seriously (Captain Hunter); 1 wounded, slightly (Private DuBois). Several Marines received minor scratches from explosions of dynamite bombs.


Two mules, completely saddled, that the point had abandoned in Tres Ravine, were captured by the bandits. Two more mules that the point abandoned in Tres Ravine were killed but their saddle equipment was recovered.

Guardia—No losses.

Bandits—Three bandits were seen to fall after Marines had shot at them and although it is the natural thing for a man to do when he is shot at, it is reasonable to assume that some of the Marine bullets found their mark and killed or wounded several bandits. One hand grenade thrown by a Marine in the main body (6) into the bandit position on Casa Hill (4) silenced some of their fire and later investigation revealed spots of blood where the grenade had exploded. Two bandits were seen to fall before Captain Hunter's Thompson sub-machine gun fire. No dead bandits were found on the field.

LA FLOR ENGAGEMENT ON MAY 14TH, 1928 (See Sketch Map No. 2.)

At daybreak Lieutenant Piper sent out a reconnaissance patrol that reconnoitered the bandit positions of the 13th on Casa Hill at (4), Uno Hill at (7), and Tres Ravine at (3). This patrol also discovered "Hidden Trail," which was a footpath that ran along the geographical crest of Casa Hill and nearly parallel to the Bocaycito Trail and about 150



MAP NO. II. LA FLOR ENGAGEMENT

All terrain heavy timber and jungle except the Trail toward La Flor which was 50 feet wide.

(10) 35 Bandits.
(12) 10 Bandits.
(11) 80 Bandits.

(13) Marine-Guardia Patrol,
37 strong.

yards east of it. It branched from the Bocaycito Trail in Tres Ravine and rejoined it near the house on Casa Hill (4).

The reconnaissance patrol disclosed no bandits so Lieutenant Piper decided that they were lying in ambush in both directions on the Bocaycito Trail as they probably preferred attacking him from ambush after he had abandoned his night position to take up the march rather than attack him in it.

The patrol was in a position that could easily become difficult. It had accomplished its mission by making contact with Sandino's bandits and had located them in sufficient force to inform the Commanding General of their then whereabouts. It was burdened with a seriously wounded man and a slightly wounded one. To save the life of the seriously (probably mortally) wounded one it had to evacuate him to a hospital which, at best, was five days away. Ammunition, rations, and medical supplies were

limited and the patrol would probably have to fight to get water.

He could expect little supply and communications assistance from the planes as the air service had not worked the patrol since its departure from Quilali on the 9th. It was expecting too much to hope that plane observers could locate the small patrol amid the mountains and jungles of the area until it reached some known point generally flown over by the planes.

Lieutenant Piper did not know the mountain and jungle to his front (toward Sandino) and did not know any route to cut his way to a friendly garrison or patrol.

Lieutenant Piper completed his estimate of the situation when his daylight reconnaissance patrol returned and decided to evacuate his wounded by retracing his steps over the route marched from Quilali.

An improvised stretcher was made for Captain Hunter by securing a navy hammock to two poles. Two men carried the poles on their shoulders.

At 8:00 a.m. the patrol was formed and marched via the Bocaycito Trail on La Flor and Quilali. The formation was a close column of files with a mule length between mules. All personnel marched dismounted, and leading their mules. The point and rear guard marched with mule length distance between individuals and mule length distance between these units and the main body. The Guardia was the rear guard. The pack train marched at the rear of the main body, and Captain Hunter was carried in the center of the main body.

As the patrol started to march south down Casa Hill toward Dry Stream and La Flor on the Bocaycito Trail a bandit appeared in the trail ahead of the point and then vanished into the brush, showing that there were bandits ahead. Lieutenant Piper placed a Thompson sub-machine gun man and a rifle grenadier as the leading men of the point and directed them to engage immediately any bandits or bandit positions that were disclosed. The terrain toward the new front was heavily wooded and with dense underbrush with the exception of the Bocaycito Trail toward La Flor which was clear and about fifty feet wide. The patrol advanced and at 8:15 a.m. a group of bandits was observed and the Thompson man fired into them. The bandits then opened a heavy fire from positions at (10) on Casa Hill, at (11) on Ocho Hill. The 40 bandits that occupied Casa Hill at (10) as the patrol cleared it had probably been in ambush on Uno and Dos Hills to engage the patrol if it had marched that way and when the bandit observers discovered that the patrol was going to march into the bandit ambush on Ocho Hill, the bandits on Uno and Dos Hills moved toward Casa Hill and occupied it as the patrol cleared it so they could attack the rear of the patrol when it was ambushed, by the bandits on Ocho Hill. It would appear that some of the bandits from Uno and Dos Hills were supposed to occupy Cinco Hill to assist in the ambush as during the latter part of the engagement about ten appeared there, evidently from the direction of Casa Hill. Probably some of the 80 bandits that were in ambush on Ocho Hill (11) came to that point direct from Uno Hill (7). From the whole setup one gathers the impression that the bandits had ambushes laid to the north and south of Casa Hill so they could engage the patrol regardless of which direction it marched

and that the ambush found unnecessary would immediately go to the aid of the attacking ambush and engage the rear of the patrol and also strengthen the firing lines of the attacking ambush.

The initial volume of bandit fire was heavy and well directed and consisted of fire from rifles, at least one Thompson sub-machine gun, and dynamite bombs. The Marines took cover in Small Stream (running water) that ran alongside the Bocaycito Trail and returned the fire. Captain Hunter was placed under cover in the stream bed but, though fatally wounded, leaped from his stretcher and insisted in participating in the fire fight and had to be overpowered and returned to his stretcher.

A desperate fire fight then ensued between the patrol and the bandits that lasted from 8:15 to 9:00 a.m. The fighting at the head of the patrol was at close quarters but the bandits at (11) on Ocho Hill kept well hidden in the jungle which came up to the edge of the trail. The head of the patrol at (13) engaged in a Thompson and hand grenade battle with the bandits facing them. Sergeant Brown made some hand grenade throws that made his comrades inquire if he was the world's champion discus thrower. He threw most of the grenades for the grenadiers. A Marine Thompson silenced a bandit Thompson by fire after determining its location by the reports from its shots. But in the rear guard and the rear of the main body things were not going so well. The bandit volume of fire from (10) on Casa Hill and the left of their line at (11) on Ocho Hill kept the Guardia rear guard and the Marines in the rear of the main body so pinned down that the bandits started to close in, some even rushing forward to the assault. The nine enlisted Guardias could not face the ordeal and although their officer, Cadet Blackburn, set a wonderful example of bravery and did all he could to hold them in the fight, they scattered and fled to the jungle of Cinco Hill. The last Guardia to get up to flee from his prone position under cover was Private Rosenberg and as he exposed himself to get up he received a bandit dum-dum bullet through the head which killed him instantly.

Cadet Blackburn, though abandoned by his men, held his ground, and in an exposed standing position, engaged the enemy with his pistol until several Marines from the main body were sent to his assistance. Lieutenant Piper then armed him with a rifle grenade outfit because Blackburn could use this weapon to better advantage than the less experienced rifle grenadiers.

Blackburn placed several rifle grenades among the enemy on Ocho Hill (1) and Casa Hill (10) which were a big help in reducing the bandit fire and stopping the bandit assault. All Browning automatic rifles, Thompsons, and Springfields in the rear of the patrol came into action against the bandits that were threatening the rear and gained fire superiority.

At 9:00 a.m. all bandit fire was silenced and Lieutenant Piper decided to continue the march. Private Rosenberg (Guardia) was hastily buried and the patrol was formed and marched. The formation was the same as when clearing Casa Hill except Marines were put at the rear of the column as the rear guard to replace the missing Guardias.

The patrol had advanced about one hundred yards when the bandits opened fire on it again. The heaviest

fire was directed against the rear of the patrol and came from the left of the bandit position on Ocho Hill (11) and Casa Hill (10). A little fire was directed against the head and flanks of the patrol and that came from the right of the bandit position on Ocho Hill (11) and from a new group of about ten bandits that had taken up a position at (12) on Cinco Hill. This group probably came from Casa Hill and may have been part of a larger group that was supposed to have occupied Cinco Hill during the ambush fight. Due to the fact that the bandits seemed to concentrate so much on the rear of the patrol, which contained the pack train, it would seem that the bandits were hoping to be able to cut the pack train out of the column. Marine Corps pack animals meant military supplies, especially ammunition, for the bandits and they generally made great efforts to capture them.

When fired upon, the patrol again took cover behind the banks of Small Stream. There was tall grass near the stream that afforded excellent cover from observation.

The rear point was subjected to superior bandit fire, and had to call for reinforcements, which Lieutenant Piper sent. All weapons got into action, but the most destructive fire (to bandit morale) was that of Cadet Blackburn's well placed rifle grenades fired from the rear of the patrol against the bandits on Ocho Hill (11).

The bandits yelled at the Marines and Guardias in Spanish during the fight and called them "muleros" and many other unkind names and told them that they were going to cut all their throats before they got out of Nicaragua and that they would run the country themselves.

By 10:15 A.M. all bandit fire was silenced and the bandits retreating toward the north (toward Sandino's "rest area"), pursued by a little Marine rifle fire.

Soon after the firing ceased a Marine Corps airplane flew down the trail so that it was directly over the trail and the patrol at an elevation of 500 feet. Some of the Marines waved their arms, but the plane observer did not see them. This was unfortunate, as it was the first plane they had seen since leaving Quilali on May 9th, and they sorely needed the communication, supply, and evacuation services the planes could furnish. Also, by means of panels, the patrol could have directed the plane to bomb the hilltop in the direction the bandits had retreated.

In reading this plane incident, the reader must remember that it is difficult for a plane observer to see the terrain directly underneath the plane. It is also difficult for plane observers to see small units of men in the jungle trails unless panels are displayed in clearings.

About 10:30 A.M. the patrol resumed the march. As it was forming, six of the eight Guardia stragglers rejoined the patrol from their jungle retreats on Cinco Hill, and about two hours later the other two rejoined the patrol on the trail.

LOSSES SUFFERED DURING COMBAT ON MAY 14

Marine Corps:—None.

Guardia:—One killed (Private Rosenberg). One Krag rifle and rifle equipment. (This was Rosenberg's

and was left behind by a Guardia who was supposed to carry it.)

Bandits:—The bodies of no dead bandits were seen, but in making this statement one must consider that the jungle positions occupied by them were not all visited. Due to the volume of Marine fire delivered from Browning automatic rifles, Thompsons, Springfield, rifle and hand grenades, that silenced the bandit fire and forced them to withdraw, it is safe to say that several of them must have been hit. In estimating the bandit casualties, it is well to remember the amount of bandit fire the patrol received, and that it only killed Rosenberg. (Men are difficult to kill, even in battle.)

To set forth the incidents of May 14th that occurred after the patrol resumed the march at 10:30 A.M., the author quotes from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:"

"On May 14th, continued march at 10:30 A.M. over previously traveled trail, but in opposite direction, our object being to evacuate wounded as soon as possible. A plane appeared directly overhead immediately we began to move, but being so directly over our column we were unable to attract his attention. We continued our way slowly but unmolested. All houses along the trail being deserted, and succeeded in reaching a fair position on high ground at 4:00 P.M. about six miles from scene of combat, where we made camp. Captain Hunter gave signs of having stood the trip very badly, and the men carrying him were in an almost exhausted condition."

INCIDENTS OF MAY 15

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "On May 15th cleared camp at 6:30 A.M., our objective being La Flor finca. Houses along trail showed signs of hasty desertion, none being occupied. Native footprints were found in trail headed in our line of march, and one place evidently had been the camping ground of a group of natives, remains of several small fires being found. Reached La Flor at 10:40 A.M., Captain Hunter again showing signs of weakness and men again exhausted. Realizing that Captain Hunter could not be moved for several days and that we could not move him without reinforcements we asked for same and also rations when planes appeared at 11:00 A.M., and, when it was found impossible to arrange a pickup at this place, the panel 'Help' was put out to give planes information that all was not well. Proceeded to make camp, surrounding same with log barricade, and gave Captain Hunter all attention possible."

La Flor was not the type of geographical location that planes would usually reconnoiter for bandit or Marine-Guardia activities.

We begin to see here the difficulties associated with evacuating one wounded man from the mountains and jungles when he has to be carried by hand. Carrying a man on a stretcher is killing work and requires large carrying parties.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 16

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "On morning of 16th when plane appeared, gave information that Captain Hunter was wounded and that we requested medical supplies. Received information that relief columns were heading in our direction, and

settled down to wait for same. Captain Hunter appeared to be gaining in strength. Private Du Bois' wound was healing nicely. Gave men all rest possible."

On this day Lieutenant Claude's patrol from Corinto Finca, which was coming to Lieutenant Piper's assistance and was only a day's march from him, became lost because of an unreliable guide and was forced to begin its return to Corinto Finca.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 17

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "On 17th planes dropped medical supplies and rations as requested. Captain Hunter resting more easily and evidently gaining strength as he was now able to swallow a few liquids and could talk much better. Planes in afternoon asked advisability of evacuating Captain Hunter via Coco River. Answered, 'Yes, considered advisable,' and prepared to move when reinforcements should arrive."

By getting Captain Hunter to the Coco River it would be possible to get him out by hydroplane, which could land on the river, or by floating him down the river by canoe. Either way would be preferable to a trip overland to a plane landing field (probably the one at Apali Hacienda).

We see here what one serious casualty can do to a patrol on an isolated mission. What would several serious casualties received on Casa Hill have done to it?

INCIDENTS OF MAY 18

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "Captain Hunter's condition remained practically unchanged until his death at 3:25 A.M. May 18, 1928. Cadet Blackburn, who was with him at the time of his death, said that he passed away quietly after a few short breaths. Cadet Blackburn called the hospital corpsman, who was sleeping about ten feet away, when he noticed the difference in breathing, but Captain Hunter died before the corpsman could reach him. Captain Hunter's courage and fortitude were inspiring up until his death.

"Buried Captain Hunter at 9:30 A.M. Gave planes information of his death when they appeared that morning. Received information when they dropped rations and more medical supplies that Major Rockey was proceeding to join our column."

INCIDENTS OF MAY 19

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "On afternoon of 19th, planes dropped sugar and gave information that Corinto column had been halted. Also that Major Rockey's column was close to junction of Cua and Guasineros Rivers. Planes asked for location of Captain Hunter's wounds. Gave chest as location of one wound as it was impossible to describe his shoulder wound by panel."

The following method of communications between the ground and the air was employed: The plane would drop a drop message to the patrol, the message containing a list of questions it wished answered, each question numbered. The patrol would lay out panels so as to show the number of the question and generally spell out the answer. This spelling out of many of the words and phrases was necessary because the nature of them was so unusual that they were not in

the Airplane Panel Code. Many panels were necessary and mosquito nets were torn up and used.

INCIDENTS OF MAY 20

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "All quiet on the 20th. Planes dropped brigade field message in morning."

INCIDENTS OF MAY 21

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "Gave planes information on morning of 21st that Major Rockey had not yet arrived. Also requested rice, coffee, and bacon, as our supply would soon be exhausted. Received rations as requested in afternoon and planes gave us information that Major Rockey was now headed in our direction."

INCIDENTS OF MAY 22

Extract from Lieutenant Piper's "Patrol Report:" "Major Rockey arrived La Flor 11:30 A.M. May 22, 1928."

The reader will observe that it took seven days to get assistance to Lieutenant Piper's patrol. It is an example of how isolated one can become in northern Nicaragua.

After Major Rockey arrived at La Flor he took charge of all troops and marched them back to their stations at Quilali, and San Albino Gold Mine and Captain Hunter's Patrol from Quilali passed into Marine Corps history.

DISCUSSION OF MATTERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ENGAGEMENT

A Meeting Engagement—The Hunter contact started as a meeting engagement and Captain Hunter's failure to realize that or to protect himself by throwing out scouts and security after the initial bandit fire was silenced at 3:55 p.m. on May 13th can be criticized. A study of the battle leads me to believe that the Jiron-Sanchez column was marching on La Flor to ambush the patrol that they knew was penetrating their "rest area." When the bandit advance guard had started up the Hidden Trail when Hill via the Hidden Trail so as to approach the house on Casa Hill unseen. Part of the bandit advance guard had started up the Hidden Trail when Captain Hunter's point encountered the remainder of it in Tres Ravine and brought on the initial firing. The part of the bandit advance guard that found themselves on Hidden Trail worked their way through the jungle to the position on Casa Hill (4) from where they could engage the flank of the patrol (6). The patrol, having superior fire, soon silenced the bandit advance guard but here Captain Hunter made the mistake of considering the battle over and not sending out scouts to reconnoiter the terrain and for security. The bandit main body under Jiron and Sanchez pushed forward on the trail, occupied Tres Ravine in force, placed a unit on Uno Hill, and probably sent more men to assist the advance guard on Casa Hill (4), and in five minutes' time they were able to re-engage the Marine-Guardia patrol with the entire bandit force. It was in this resultant fire fight that Captain Hunter, Corporal Williamson and Private DuBois were shot.

Captain Hunter's service in the Dominican Republic had probably led him to underestimate the

fighting qualities of the Nicaraguan bandits and he undoubtedly thought that when the initial bandit firing ceased that the bandits had fled. Marines must learn that modern weapons and better leaders make it more possible for their enemies to face them in severe infantry fire fights. We must know that "meeting engagements" are still easily possible for small units operating in mountains and jungle.

An interesting feature of this fight is that the bandits occupied Tres Ravine (deliberately or accidentally) and from that low position engaged the patrol above them on Casa Hill. As a rule the bandits always selected ground that would command that occupied by Marine-Guardia units. Of course, it is easily possible that the bandits that fought from Tres Ravine were originally intended for the position at (4) on Casa Hill and were cut off by the Marine fire while en route to that position.

The Point of the Patrol—The Marines in the point were well trained in their duties and had had much practical experience in the points of patrols. Among them was a North American Indian (Private Hon-yust) who though city reared possessed instinctive powers of close observation.

Captain Hunter erred in not having Guardias in the point. This could have been done in different ways. He could have placed two Guardias at the head of the single point he used, or he could have had a double point out by having a point of Guardias preceding the Marine point. The Guardia point could have been composed of one-half of the Guardia personnel, or five persons. It could have preceded the Marine point with 20 yards distance between persons and between the two points. The other five Guardia could have been employed as rear point or on the pack train.

It has been proven that a native Nicaraguan in the Guardia can detect the enemy's presence where a Marine will fail to do so. This is only natural. To detect the presence of the enemy one must be able to notice and correctly interpret those telltale signs that a poorly trained and disciplined enemy generally leaves. The native Nicaraguan can pick up unusual signs in the foreground because his eyes are accustomed to observing the mountains and jungles when everything is normal and he will notice things that are suspicious. To the Marine the whole foreground is unusual and he is liable to miss details that would expose the enemy.

We do not know what a Guardia point would have exposed on the initial contact on May 13th but we do know that the Marine point did not see the enemy until it was fired upon.

It is difficult for one who has never marched on a mountain trail through jungles to realize how difficult it is for a point to expose an enemy. Even Guardia points of excellent Nicaraguan soldiers have been known to pass through a bandit ambush without detecting it. As the bandit war in Nicaragua continues, the bandits become better soldiers and develop more capable leaders, with the result that their ambushes become increasingly difficult to expose. Many bandit ambushes have been disclosed because a bandit with a nervous trigger finger fired at the point. Experience and leadership reduces these premature firings.

Captain Hunter made a practice of marching with

the point. That brings up the question of just how much a commander of a unit should expose himself to enemy fire when the tasks can be performed by subordinates. Personally I do not think that Captain Hunter should have been with the point but we do not know what actuated him. He was undoubtedly the most experienced bush warfare man in the column and the best on "trail knowledge" and he may have felt that this knowledge should be employed in that part of the column that would make first contact with the enemy. If that was his motive I think that he was wrong. The success of a mission, even the safety of a unit, too often depends wholly upon the leaders. Too often they alone have the knowledge, training and experience necessary for success and safety. They should not jeopardize their lives unnecessarily. It is very difficult for aggressive, courageous officers to hold themselves back but they must consider the welfare of the unit and not their own personal feelings.

Sometimes trails are unknown, many, and confusing, and the leader alone is able to select the route he wishes to follow. Under such conditions it is excusable for him to be in or near the point until he can get the point on the trail he wishes to follow, then he should drop back.

Captain Hunter had an excellent second in command and that probably made him less careful of his own safety.

Medical Personnel as Combatants — Hospital Corpsman Young was a courageous, aggressive blue-jacket and often accompanied the point as he "wanted to get in the fight." Many of the medical personnel the Marines get from the Navy wish to participate as combatants in the actual fighting of the Marines but this should be discouraged. The medical personnel should be taught that, unless the situation requires every man in the firing line to save the unit, their mission is to care for the wounded and to preserve themselves from becoming casualties as long as possible so the wounded will receive expert medical attention.

Interpreters and the Gaining of Information—Captain Hunter, Lieutenant Piper, and one enlisted Marine had a fair knowledge of the Spanish language. Cadet Blackburn, commanding the Guardia, did not know Spanish. The enlisted Guardias do not seem to have been able to get any helpful information from the inhabitants. This was only natural because until the people of an area have confidence in the Guardia they hesitate to come forward with information against bandits. Too often they feel that there may be bandit sympathizers among the Guardias that will inform on them to bandits or bandit sympathizers. The peace-loving native of the bandit-infested mountains and jungles generally finds it to his interest to "know nothing." The Marines and Guardia cannot post a guard around every Nicaraguan that has incurred the hatred of the bandits whereas, on the other hand, the bandits can come along and lop the head from the body of any of their enemies that find themselves many yards from the protection of Marine Corps and Guardia weapons. Assassination, or "putting them on the spot" as our Chicago bandits say, will silence many tongues apart from those of the slain.

Fighting Qualities of the Marines—In studying

this engagement I was soon impressed by the excellent fight put up by the Marines. The reader will observe their high morale, their willingness to engage the bandits in a fire fight at close quarters, the rapidity with which men went to the assistance of threatened points, their careful expenditure of ammunition, and the apparent effectiveness of their fire. I attribute the above to the length of time the officers and men had served together, the very good training the enlisted men had received and the good leadership by the officers and non-commissioned officers.

Lieutenant Piper states that the coolness of the men under fire, their general efficiency, and their careful expenditure of ammunition was more pronounced in the second day's fighting than in the first. Men are bound to become veterans in battle if they are allowed to survive several ugly engagements.

Ammunition Supply—Individual Marines averaged an expenditure of about one-half of their ammunition and grenade supplies. When we remember that there were only 30 rifle grenades and 24 hand grenades in the patrol we can realize how carefully all ammunition was expended.

Considering the mission and the situation I feel that the patrol should have had more ammunition and would assign the following reserve supply to the pack train: 50 hand grenades, 75 rifle grenades, 2,000 rounds caliber .30, 1,000 rounds caliber .45. This could be carried on three pack animals (light loads).

Lieutenant Piper states that the reason they did not have any ammunition in the pack train was because they were afraid of having the pack animals killed or captured in a contact and that for that reason Captain Hunter wished all ammunition on the persons of the men. Captain Hunter estimated that his ammunition supply was sufficient and we see that it was, with 50 per cent to spare. Lieutenant Piper states that if he was to make the same patrol over again, with the same mission and under the same conditions, he would not change his ammunition supply.

Armament of the Officers—In this engagement we have all the officers seeing fit to arm themselves with weapons other than their pistols. Captain Hunter with a Thompson, Lieutenant Piper with a Springfield, and Cadet Blackburn with a rifle grenadier's outfit. The question that arises is whether they should have been so armed when they started out. Lieutenant Piper states that were he to make the patrol over again he would be armed with a Thompson as he considers it the ideal weapon for infantry fighting at ranges under two hundred yards. (The dangerous ranges of an infantry fire fight.)

There has been much discussion about how an officer should be armed in battle and his duties in battle. Of course an officer's first duty with a small patrol is to lead his men and control and direct their fire but I am sure he can do this just as well with a Thompson or Springfield in his hands as with a Colt pistol in his holster.

What is the ideal weapon for the officer on the battlefield? I do not know. It depends on the situation. In rushing an enemy position and in being rushed I would suggest a Thompson. In a shooting duel at over two hundred yards I would suggest a Springfield.

Armament of the Enlisted Marines—The Platoon Sergeant who was armed with a pistol should have had a Thompson.

There should have been an additional Thompson in each squad, which would have given them two Thompsons, and one Browning per squad. With these additional Thompsons in the patrol the .45 ammunition in the pack train should be increased from one thousand to two thousand rounds.

Automatic Fire—Indications are that much of the fire from the Thompsons and Browning automatic rifles was automatic, and not semi-automatic. In this situation where the patrol was on the defensive and more interested in driving the bandits off than in holding them in the fight I would say that some automatic fire in short bursts would raise the morale of the Marines and Guardia and lower the morale of the bandits and at the same time prove effective in combing spots apparently occupied by the unseen enemy. But automatic fire from Thompson and Browning automatic rifles is seldom advisable. The casualties are not commensurate with the amount of ammunition expended. Poorly trained men allowed to fire automatic fire will burn up all their ammunition and hit none of the enemy.

Employment of Hand and Rifle Grenades—An interesting feature of the fight is the employment of hand grenades. Hand grenades thrown out in the open can easily prove as dangerous to friendly troops as to the enemy. In fact, excited, poorly trained hand grenadiers can be a menace to their own comrades and unit commanders should be very careful in the selection of men for hand grenadiers.

The fact that Captain Hunter's hand grenadiers employed their grenades effectively and without harm to their comrades proves their excellent selection, training and coolness in action.

Lieutenant Piper states that the rifle grenades were the most effective weapons in breaking up the bandit attacks on the rear of his column on May 14th.

Rifle grenades have a greater morale than physical effect. They tend to lower the morale of the enemy and raise ours. In this engagement the employment of rifle grenades was very commendable. This was a situation where the Marines were not interested in holding the bandits in the fight and inflicting heavy casualties, but in driving them off, casualties or no casualties.

Efficiency of Weapons—One Browning automatic rifle jammed and had to be field stripped to get it back into action. All hand and rifle grenades exploded, as did all the bandit dynamite bombs.

Bandit Personnel and Armament—It appears that Sandino had additional troops around his two main camps or out on other missions. It is difficult to explain the absence of bandit machine guns in this contact. One Thompson seems to be the only automatic weapon they employed and that proved to be very dangerous.

The effectiveness of the bandit Thompson sub-machine gun is interesting. Some Marines that have been shot at by bandit Thompsons belittle the range and smashing power of the .45 caliber bullet that comes out of the Thompson. These Marines make the mistake of judging all Thompsons by those in the hands of the bandits. Thompsons, like other weapons

that are fired both semi-automatically and automatically, must have their worn barrels replaced by new ones. The bandits evidently make no provision to get extra barrels for their Thompsons.

After the Liberals and Conservatives laid down their arms in 1927 I tested several Thompsons turned in by the Liberals and discovered that their barrels were so worn that the bullets had very little range, accuracy or smashing power.

The Marines and Guardia carry extra barrels with Cutt's compensator attached and replace worn barrels with them.

The Cutt's compensator on the Marine and Guardia Thompsons make them better weapons than those handled by the bandits because the compensator takes up much of the recoil and upward climb of the muzzle when firing and enables the firer to get on his target and stay on it easier than when firing a Thompson without a Cutt's compensator.

Entrenching Tools:—Very few were carried as the men could not carry everything that belongs to an army. A couple of big shovels and picks on the ammunition mules will be a big help if a small unit is surrounded and has to dig in and fight it out.

Medical Supplies:—A patrol of this nature should have ample medical supplies, especially bandages. This patrol did not have sufficient. All the first aid packages of the men were used up and then the Hospital Corpsman resorted to mosquito nets.

Action of the Guardia:—The Guardia, as a whole, are excellent fighting men in bush warfare. When well led, they are very courageous and aggressive in the attack. During the Bandit War in Nicaragua their individual acts of heroism have compared very favorably with those of the Marines. To understand the action of the Guardia in the Hunter Contact we must consider the certain characteristics of the Nicaraguan native that apply in this case.

They have little confidence in their leader, their chief, unless they know him personally. Blackburn's Guardia did not know him and he was not able to talk to them in their language. Had they known that Blackburn was a fearless and a very efficient fighter they would probably have been willing to trust their safety to him.

They must be made to feel that they are getting justice and a square deal at all times. These men seem to have gained the impression from some source (probably not an authorized one) that they had done their bit in the bandit area and were due for relief. Therefore they were dissatisfied and willing to lay down on the job and quit.

In the flight of the Guardia we have an interesting example of Nicaraguan tactics. These Guardia were outnumbered and considered themselves unable to fight with the advantage in their favor, therefore, they scattered and fled. When the battle was over they showed up with their weapons and evidently prepared to participate in any further fighting. We have here one of the most discouraging features of the Bandit War in Nicaragua. A Marine-Guardia unit engages a bandit unit. The bandits fight as long as they think they have the advantage, then they disperse and flee from the scene to some assembly area, where they gather together again and are all enthusiastic about their late encounter, which resulted in only one or two deaths to themselves and the fifteen or twenty they are sure they inflicted on the Marine-Guardia unit.

The fact that they hit only a few of their enemies does not occur to them. They like to cajole themselves by believing they have inflicted heavy losses on the Marine-Guardia unit. This sort of cajolery is not confined to the bandits—it occurred during the Civil War and the World War.

The point to remember is that when bandits disperse and flee that it is their method of disengaging themselves from an unfavorable engagement and they are farther from defeat than if they had stuck and fought it out. Each bandit breaks off contact and flees in good order, and with all his equipment, to the assembly area, where the band will gather to prepare for further operations.

We Marines are too prone to consider bandit and Marine units in flight in the same sense, but a bandit unit in flight is a unit employing good bandit tactics, whereas, if ever a Marine unit take to flight, that day will be a sorry one for the "Yanqui."

Ranges and Use of Cover:—We do not know what the bandit casualties were, but it appears that those "seen to fall" were shot at close ranges and when they were exposed. One thing is certain; the casualties suffered by the bandits the first day did not discourage them from fighting the second day.

We know that four members of the patrol were hit and under the following conditions:

Captain Hunter, by a Thompson at 50 yards, while standing up, fully exposed;

Corporal Williamson, by a Thompson at 75 yards, while running in an upright position and fully exposed to observation;

Private Rosenberg, by a rifle at an unknown range, probably less than 75 yards, after he had exposed himself by getting up from behind excellent cover;

Private Du Bois, by a rifle, while prone but exposed to observation.

The more one studies the casualties suffered by the Marines, Guardia, and bandits in Nicaragua, the more one realizes that men generally hit in an infantry fire fight are hit when they expose themselves to observation at ranges under two hundred yards, generally under one hundred yards. (Motto: Do not expose yourself unnecessarily.) Of course, there are many situations where men and officers, particularly officers, must expose themselves. If necessary, it must be done fearlessly and with the knowledge that even exposed men are difficult to hit.

In some situations a unit will move forward so slowly when taking advantage of all cover that if it is being subjected to much fire it will suffer more casualties than it would have suffered had it ignored some of the cover, exposed itself and finished the job fast and furiously. Deciding when to abandon cover so as to enable his unit to get at the enemy with bullet and bayonet is one of the difficulties that confronts all leaders of platoons or smaller units. We have seen in this battle where Captain Hunter and Corporal Williamson were shot when they exposed themselves and rushed forward in the open to close with the bandits. It is difficult to estimate what would have happened had the group that rushed forward to the military crest crawled forward instead, using available cover. As the bandit volume of fire was heavy, it is easily possible that the patrol would have suffered heavier casualties by a slow movement over ground that was being combed with bullets.

Cul de Sac

By

MAJOR JOHN A. GRAY,
U. S. M. C.



IN THE MOUNTAINS OF HAITI

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION and the fall of the old order in Europe was mirrored in France's distant colonial possession across the seas when in 1804 the slaves rose in the West Indies and sparing neither age nor sex overthrew their white masters and established the island republic of Haiti. The young nation profitted little by its new won freedom, for there followed a century of bloody rule, marked by battle, murder and sudden death, finally culminating in a prison massacre and the retaliatory slaughter of the president, Guiuame Sam, under circumstances so revolting in their gruesome details that the United States, rather than watch the intervention of a foreign power, was forced to land its naval forces to restore some semblance of order. The American Occupation gave Haiti a new deal and for three years the work of regeneration moved forward without interruption, directed by those agencies established by the United States and Haiti; the Garde d'Haiti, the Public Health Service, and the Public Works Service. But late in 1918 the wheels of progress slowed down; an insurrection of no mean proportions broke out in the north of the island. As the disaffection passed beyond the control of the Garde, the Marine garrisons at Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince were drawn upon, and soon, from the Cap as far south as the Artibonite Valley, Marine and Garde patrols were combing the jungles of the hill country for "Cacos," as the insurgents were called. The instigator of the revolt and the chief leader of the Cacos was a man of considerable intelligence and ability by the name of Charlemange Perault. Charlemange with his chiefs and sub-chiefs conducted a guerilla warfare in the north. South, in the Artibonite Valley the "Gros Negre" and most important leader of the Cacos was Benoit Batrville. In this region, Colonel Walter N. Hill, commanding the department of Port-au-Prince, was in immediate charge of all field operations of the Garde d'Haiti and the Marine Corps, with his headquarters at Mirebalais.

When the Caco trouble started I was serving under Colonel Hill as commanding officer of the Caserne Dartignave in Port-au-Prince and was with

him in February, 1919, when he attacked Benoit at Boucan Carre, the first contact between the Garde and the Cacos in the Artibonite Valley. After this affair he moved his headquarters from Port-au-Prince to Mirebalais and personally took charge of operations. He sent me north with five officers and sixty gendarmes into the area bounded by Petite Riviere de L'Artibonite-Dessalines-St. Michel-Maissade with orders to rid it of Cacos. Establishing patrol headquarters at Perodin, I kept the gendarmes constantly on the go, so that Cacos in this area never knew when or where a patrol would drop in on them. At the end of four months, thanks to the untiring efforts of my patrol leaders, Lieutenants Neuhaus, Place, Williston, Kelly, and Wirkus, the area was fairly clear. By June there was a lull in our activities, for Cacos were very scarce, and Colonel Hill gave me permission to visit Port-au-Prince for a rest. Back in the Capital life moved along much as it had before I went to Perodin. Colonel Hill was at Mirebalais directing the operations against Benoit. I had completed over three years of duty with the Garde and was on my seventh year of continuous sea and foreign service. Colonel William G. Fay, the detail officer at Marine Corps Headquarters, had promised me a tour of sea duty in the U. S. Atlantic Fleet when I finished my detail in the Garde, and I was expecting my orders any day. One morning in the latter part of June, I was watching the instruction of my gendarmes in the intricacies of position and aiming drill, knowledge of which recent contacts with the Cacos had proved the necessity for if any killing other than by the officers was to be accomplished. A gendarme orderly marched briskly across the parade ground and clicking his heels before me stated that I was wanted on the telephone at Department Headquarters. Colonel Hill was on the line. He stated that he had definite and reliable information that Benoit and his band were camped in the mountains that bordered the Cul De Sac north of Thomazeau. The Cacos were supposed to be camped near a small lake located at the foot of a valley a few miles north of the town, Colonel Hill was marching that night with a company of marines and a detach-

ment of the garde to the head of this valley. He directed me to pick one officer and fifteen gendarmes from the Caserne Dartignave and proceed to this lake and find Benoit's camp. Our mission was to "jump" Benoit and his band from their hiding place. Colonel Hill figured that the Cacos would head up the valley when we opened fire on them, directly into his ambush of marines and gendarmes. He specifically directed that I was not to open fire before 4 A.M. Colonel Hill had me repeat back his instructions and hung up. Benoit had ambushed and killed my adjutant, Lieutenant Moskoff. More recently he had ambushed and killed my best friend, Major "Johnny" Mayer, U.S.M.C. I was not loathe to participate in an ambush that might give him some of his own medicine. I selected Captain Stallworth as the officer to accompany me. Stallworth's stock was not very high at Garde Headquarters at this time, but for reasons that had nothing to do with his military efficiency. The fifteen gendarmes I picked very carefully from those still remaining at the Caserne. Three or four of those selected wore the medaille militaire. They were of the detachment of ten men that had a few months before carried Lieutenant Moskoff, mortally wounded, ten miles on a litter from Dufailly into Mirebalais, fighting a running battle with a large band of Cacos the entire distance. It was high noon when we embarked on the little narrow gauge cane train and trundled out across the Cul De Sac towards Thomazeau.

In French colonial days the plain of the Cul De Sac was the most productive spot in all St. Dominique, as Haiti was then called. Sparkling water from the nearby mountains coursed through its stone irrigation canals, and Negro slaves toiled to gather the cane and indigo that cultivation and a salubrious climate produced in wonderful quality and abundance. Now crumbling masonry and scraggy cane fields fought with the encroaching jungle in the Cul De Sac, and the descendants of these same slaves scratched a precarious existence from the soil that once sent its rich products across the sea to replenish imperial coffers. North, a mountain rampart, heavily wooded, and clothed in jungle growth, rose abruptly from the plain, no different today than in those far off times. Somewhere in these hills that loomed dark and forbidding through the waves of quivering heat, lurked bands of Cacos, relentlessly hunted and pursued, but evading death or capture no less cunningly than the equally savage beasts in African jungles. The sun was casting long shadows when we drew into Thomazeau. To the little tin-roofed shack that served as the garde post we summoned the Judge-de-Paix and other dignitaries and "bon habitants" of the town. "Yes, there is such a lake back in the hills." "No, it is not very far, there are those in Thomazeau who have been there." "Most certainly, Commandante, a guide will be furnished familiar with the way." It was dusk when we left the mud huts of the little village behind us and a great full moon was rising above the plain as we slowly mounted the narrow trail that wound into the mountains.

Stallworth and I had borrowed a couple of loped mules from the Judge-de-Paix at Thomazeau, but we were soon forced to leave these tied up beside the trail. And now commenced as long and hard a climb as it was ever my lot to make in Haiti. At times the trail went almost straight up so that we had to

haul ourselves ahead by the vines and bushes. It was midnight when we reached the crest of the ridges we had watched through the heat haze that afternoon. Soaked through with sweat, I halted the patrol for a brief rest. The moon was now directly overhead and one could easily have read a newspaper by its light. The trail skirted the edge of rocky, limestone cliffs. On our left as we advanced it dropped off sheer, for how many hundreds of feet we did not know. Far below lay the great plain of the Cul-De-Sac, extending until it met the shimmering line of Port-au-Prince Bay. For an hour we made good time and then our guide began to hesitate and cast around like a hound on a cold scent. Our pace slowed down to a crawl. The path was plain enough and still ran close to the cliffs. The guide, however, said that he was looking for a trail that branched from the one we were on and led to the lake we were seeking. This backing and filling of the guide kept up for five or ten minutes until we lost all patience with him. We were not getting anywhere. Finally, in reply to fluent and profane queries in Creole, the guide bluntly admitted that he was lost. He did not know where the lake was. We were convinced that the fellow was lying. There is a way to jog the memory of a reluctant guide that is not laid down in the text books. The beauty of the method is that it does not leave any permanent mark nor does it place the recipient of the attention hors-de-combat. The guide had a two-foot length of cocomaque club such as is almost universally carried by the Haitian peasant on his travels afoot, and by the women when they mount the little native burriques that bear them to market. With this they urge the sleepy little beasts to the desired degree of acceleration by batting them over their long, drooping ears. A gendarme on each side of the guide now held him by the arms. He was tapped, gently at first, but with increasing force on that soft part of the neck that covers the jugular vein. After each tap of the cocomaque, he was asked whether he could remember the way to the lake. The guide stood it until his eyes began to bulge, when he dropped to his knees and babbled that he had experienced a miraculous return of memory, thanks to the gracious help of the Bon Dieu, and that he was now ready to lead the "blancs" to the hidden lake. The march was resumed, the guide with a strong cord around his neck in the event that he decided suddenly to leave the patrol. It was after 2:00 A.M. and I was beginning to wonder if we were going to find our lake and the Caco camp in time to jump Benoit at four o'clock, when a glimmer of light flickered ahead on the trail. I halted the patrol and Stallworth and I advanced cautiously up the trail to reconnoiter, our rifles unlocked, at the ready. Perhaps one hundred yards from where the patrol was halted a group of low-branched mango trees loomed up ahead. Among the trees the mud walls and grass thatched roofs of several native huts showed clearly in the moonlight. Around the yard of this "habitation," a fence of piled stones and growing cactus kept the hogs from straying into the jungle. The trail led into this yard through an opening in the fence, in the center of which the coals and embers of a small fire glowed dully. The fire was dying and threw no light into the heavy shadows cast by the thick branches of the mango trees, which effectively concealed objects below the level of the stone fence. Ten paces from the fire Stallworth grasped my arm

and we halted in our tracks. In the shadows directly beyond the smoldering fire, a man sat facing us on a log. His arms rested on his drawn up knees and a rifle lay across his lap, while his head fell forward on his chest as he dozed. For a half minute or more we stood rooted to the spot, then slowly, carefully, without turning, began retracing our steps. We made no noise, but some jungle instinct roused the sleeping Caco sentry, and he raised his head and looked full at us as we stood revealed in the flooding moonlight not a dozen feet from where he sat. Instantly he galvanized into action. Leaping to his feet, he whirled, and started for the group of huts in the center of the yard clearing. At the same instant three other figures detached themselves from the deep shadows of a nearby mango tree. There was nothing else to do. I fired at the back of the nearest fleeing Caco and rushed through the gate, followed by Stallworth, who opened fire on the three figures near the mango tree. My recollection of the next two or three minutes is rather indistinct. Things happened too quickly. The gendarmes joined us on the run and poured into the yard, firing as they ran. Cacos seemed to spring from everywhere and the yard was full of the crack of carbines and shouts and yells. Why none of our patrol was hit in this wild and indiscriminate firing I will never understand. Quicker than it takes to tell it the yard was emptied except for the gendarmes and ourselves. The Caco that I had fired on as he ran to give the alarm, lay writhing like a wounded snake, and a gendarme put him out of his misery with a machete that he picked up in one of the huts. We ransacked the huts thoroughly. There was the usual trash found in a raided Caco camp. "Makoots" full of rice and beans, empty gourds, pieces of sugar cane, but in the largest hut we found several denim coats with bits of scarlet cloth sewed on the sleeves in crude imitation of shoulder straps. Stallworth and I were heartsick. We had jumped a big Caco camp containing a number of their leaders, probably Benoit himself. I pictured Colonel Hill's disgust at this premature opening of his carefully planned ambush. Our guide had disappeared in the confusion of the contact, but we figured that the lake must be very close, for without a water supply nearby, why this "habitation" on top of the mountain? On the opposite side of the clearing was another opening in the low stone fence and from here the trail that we had come by continued on. A Caco sentry had probably been stationed here, too, for a fire burned in this opening. Stallworth and I strolled over and lay down by this fire, which felt grateful to our bodies clad in our sweat-drenched clothes. The men had used all the water in their canteens, so I ordered three of them to each take a gourd and go up the trail a ways to try and locate the lake and bring back water for the patrol. Meanwhile, the remainder of the patrol poked around in the huts and clearing for the odds and ends of junk that so delight the hearts of the foraging gendarme. At the speed with which the Cacos took off, they were probably across the mountains and into the Artibonite Valley by now. The water detail was scarcely out of sight when we were brought to our feet by the sound of a heavy burst of rifle fire from the direction these men had taken. I had never heard such an expenditure of ammunition from Cacos, who invariably were short of ammunition for their obsolete and many calibered firearms. The first thought that flashed into my mind was that our

men had run into a marine patrol and had been taken for the enemy. Two of my friends, Lieutenants Ruble and Sampson were killed in this way. We were shortly put right about this. From a line of trees about fifty yards from where we had been lying came a blast of rifle fire that tore into the low branches of the mango trees above our heads. Before the next volley of slugs came over, our water detail dashed into the yard and joined the patrol, now crouched behind the stone fence and pouring "rapid fire" into the Caco position. The Cacos were very close and between bursts of their fire were shouting the interesting things they were going to do to the "fou blancs" when they had taken us. Up to the present time Cacos had never rushed a marine or garde patrol, but at this moment the probability of the maneuver appeared imminent. We shifted from



CUL DE SAC AREA, HAITI

"rapid fire" to "volley fire" and sent three volleys crashing in quick succession into the shadows from which came the slugs and yells of the noisy gang that had turned the tables on us. Our position was not a good one; both of our flanks were in the air. In the lull that followed our volleys I gave the word and we made a dash for a pile of rocks in the rear of the enclosure, which offered better flank protection, and put the steep cliffs that fell off hundreds of feet into the Cul-De-Sac, at our backs. At least no Cacos could work in behind us. The Cacos gradually worked across our front and shots began to come from both flanks. Our volleys, however, appeared to have had a salutary effect and I no longer feared that we might be rushed. The affair now settled down to desultory firing on the part of the Cacos and an occasional volley from our patrol to let them know that we were on the alert. The conduct of the gendarmes was admirable, they really appeared to be enjoying themselves (which I am frank to say I was not), and between lulls in the firing chatted in an undertone as unconcerned as if

they were back in barracks. For the remainder of the night we rested on the defensive, a half circle of Cacos facing us and the friendly cliffs at our backs.

The mountain mists were dissipating under the grateful warmth of early sunrise, when we eased our cramped and stiffened muscles and crawled from the shelter of the rock pile. Fire from the Cacos that had continued through the night had for some time ceased. We advanced slowly and carefully up the trail, which soon debouched into a deep, heavily wooded valley. There were no signs of the enemy and so we cast about in search of the lake and the water that our parched throats now so insistently demanded. Suddenly from far away where the head of the valley appeared to end in a defile that split the mountain ridge,

came the faint rattle of machine guns and the popping of rifle fire. Colonel Hill's ambush had opened up.

Colonel Hill inflicted some losses on Benoit in this encounter, but the arch villain himself escaped, and was a thorn in the side of the American Occupation for months to come. He had the colossal impudence to attack Port-au-Prince with about 400 of his followers, in January, 1920, and was repulsed with heavy losses. Shortly after this attempt on the Capital, Benoit met his death in battle, a manner which I feel sure that he would have preferred, had he any choice in the matter. A patrol led by Captain Jesse L. Perkins, U.S.M.C., gained contact with his band, and Benoit fell with a bullet through his heart, the last of the important chiefs of the 1919-1920 Caco Uprising.



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THE WRIGHT B-1, THE ORIGINAL NAVY SEA-PLANE

Marine Corps Aviation

By Major Edwin North McClellan, U.S.M.C.

This story of Marine Corps Aviation began in the May, 1931 number of this magazine and was continued in August. This is the final installment.

* * *

Major General Commandant George Barnett, on April 9, 1915, recommended that two Marine Officers be assigned as members of a class that was to be assembled for instruction in aviation. On September 28, 1915, the Office of Naval Aeronautics (Operations) recommended to the Bureau of Navigation that a class of officers and men be ordered to duty for instruction in aeronautics every three months composed of certain ratings which included one sergeant, one corporal and one private. In addition eight petty officers, seaman branch, and two sergeants were "desired for instruction in flying in addition to instruction as mechanics. These men should be specially selected for their good character and efficiency and be given the same physical examination that officers are required to take before being detailed to aviation duty."

In 1915 all Navy Air Pilots were required to fly straight out to sea about fifty miles to locate a destroyer and then return to the base at Pensacola. There was not a single instrument on the plane except a navy boat compass which was not compensated. The planes were not designed to land in open sea and no pilot had ever had experience in landing at sea. The motors at that time were such that it was somewhat doubtful that they would run the length of time necessary to fly one hundred miles. The only way of getting an approximately correct course was to have a boat, at the sea-buoy, steam in the direction of the destroyer; the plane would fly up the wake of the boat, noting the reading of the boat compass and hold that course until the destroyer was sighted; then fly home on the reverse course.

The Muster Roll for June 30, 1915, shows First Lieutenants Cunningham and Smith, Second Lieu-

tenant McIlvain and eleven Marines on aviation duty at Pensacola.

First Lieutenant Francis T. Evans was the fourth Marine Officer to join Navy aviation. Lieutenant Evans, on November 16, 1914, requested "that on the expiration of my tour of duty in Guam, I be ordered to Aviation duty." Major Henry C. Davis, Commanding Officer at Guam, in his approving indorsement wrote that "this officer I think would make a good aviator and has frequently expressed the desire for such duty." On January 9, 1915, the Major General Commandant informed Lieutenant Evans that "owing to the lack of available officers in the Marine Corps your request for aeronautic duty cannot be considered at the present time." On April 9, 1915, Lieutenant Evans was detached to the United States and he reported at the Naval Aeronautic Station, Pensacola, on July 2, 1915. On the date of reporting he was designated a "Student Aviator," and "Naval Aviator" on March 9, 1916. He is Naval Aviator No. 22.

Lieutenant Evans writes that he started flying at Pensacola on July 2, 1915, and learned to fly in the "old pusher seaplane," in which the motor was directly behind the pilot and the student who sat side by side on canvas seats. There was no fuselage, the tail surfaces being secured by four bamboo poles.

On August 17, 1915, Secretary of the Navy Daniels wrote to the Secretary of War: "It is desired to train a limited number of naval aviators to fly land-machines, in order to provide for Advanced Base Operation of the Navy, and to have officers of the Marine Corps so trained that they will be available when the Marines are acting with the Army." He suggested that "not more than two officers at any one time," be thus detailed and that they could start on October 1. The Army approved.

Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Mustin, on August 24, 1915, nominated Lieutenant (j. g.) Godfrey de

Courcelles Chevalier, U. S. Navy and Lieutenant McIlvain, U. S. M. C., for this duty, but for some reason they did not receive orders to the duty.

In his Annual Report dated October 6, 1915, Major-General Commandant George Barnett stated that "four officers and twelve enlisted men are now on Aviation Duty with the Naval Aeronautic Section."

Lieutenant Cunningham's back was broken in 1916, while making the first catapult take-off ever made from a warship underway. It was made from the **North Carolina** off Pensacola. The catapult did not function properly and the plane thus was not able to secure flying-speed. The disturbed air in the wake of the ship knocked one wing up. Since the plane was stalling the controls would not function and the plane turned over and fell on Lieutenant Cunningham. He did not know his back was broken until several years later when an X-ray disclosed that fact. At the time the injury was supposed to be a torn ligament. Lieutenant Cunningham was strapped up with tape for about three months. While he was laid up for that period he was not carried on the sick-list and rode in an automobile to his station every day.

On March 11, 1916, Captain Mark L. Bristol reported that he had "detached Bellinger, Read, Carey, Scofield, Chevalier, McIlvain, temporary duty on board **North Carolina** for experimental firing off Mobile and experiments Guantanamo Bay. * * *." Lieutenant McIlvain reported on the **North Carolina**, March 13.

Lieutenant Evans, on March 18, 1916, requested orders to the U. S. Army Aviation School at San Diego, Calif., "to receive instructions in land flying." Captain Bristol "Commanding Officer of the Air Service," on April 14, recommended that he be ordered to that duty after July 1, 1916.

The fifth officer to join Navy aviation was First Lieutenant Roy S. Geiger, who was appointed Student Naval Aviator on March 31, 1916, by the Commandant at Pensacola. This appointment was approved by the Major General Commandant on April 25, 1916, after Lieutenant Geiger had joined Pensacola on March 31, 1916. He was designated Naval Aviator No. 49.

Up to June of 1916 Marine Corps aviators and mechanics were simply individuals serving with aeronautic organizations of the Navy. All flying in the Navy was water-flying. Serious efforts had been made to secure the opportunity for Marines to fly land-planes.

On April 28, 1916, Lieutenant Cunningham addressed the following letter to Major-General Commandant George Barnett: "When it is decided to send Marine officers to the Army Aviation School for instruction in land flying, it is requested that I be sent. I wrote a letter some time ago stating that I would like to take instruction in land flying. I did not know that it was necessary to make formal application for this assignment." Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Mustin, Commanding Officer of the U. S. Navy Aeronautic Station at Pensacola, on the 29th, forwarded this application approved with the "request that about two months notice be given this Stations prior to Lieutenant Cunningham's detachment, in order that a suitable relief, for his work in Charge of Motor Erecting Shop be obtained."

On May 3, 1916, Captain Bristol, in approving the above request of Lieutenant Cunningham, wrote that

it "should take precedence over the request of Lieutenant Francis T. Evans, U. S. M. C., which was forwarded approved previously, if the Major-General Commandant approves," and that "Lieutenant Evans should be assigned to this duty in the next class." Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, on May 9, recommended that "when detail of Marine officers to the Army Aviation School is made First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham's request be given precedence over that of First Lieutenant Francis T. Evans." Accordingly, Colonel John A. Lejeune, the Assistant Commandant, on May 11, directed that Lieutenant Cunningham be ordered to the Army Aviation School before Lieutenant Evans.

The orders of Lieutenant Cunningham, dated June 1, directed him to "proceed to San Diego, Calif., and report to the Commanding Officer of the Signal Corps Aviation School for temporary duty in attendance at the course of instruction at that school," and authorized him to delay reporting until June 30.

Lieutenant Cunningham was the first officer, of the Navy or Marine Corps, to be ordered to purely land flying.

On June 1, 1916, Lieutenant McIlvain was ordered to proceed to San Diego and report to the Commanding Officer of the Signal Corps Aviation School. He was ordered to Pensacola from San Diego on November 24, 1916.

An Old-Timer wrote: "During the year 1916 the Marine Aviation Section at Pensacola materially increased the number of enlisted mechanics. B. L. Smith was an aircraft inspector at a factory. Cunningham and McIlvain were ordered to North Island, California, to get land-plane instruction from the Army. Evans remained at Pensacola in command of our Aviation Section and instructing in flying until a few days after war was declared."

On June 7, 1916, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels wrote Major-General Commandant George Barnett that "it is desired that the Major-General Commandant submit from time to time recommendations relative to the organization of aeronautic units for the advance base organizations of the Marine Corps," and that "it is believed that these organizations should be such as to provide for the operation of both land and water aeroplanes and also kite balloons."

A memorandum on the "Proposed Organization for Aeronautics in the Marine Corps," dated June 24, 1916, signed by C. H. Bronson for Captain J. S. McKean, U. S. Navy, read as follows:

"As soon as practicable establish an aeronautic section with the first Marine Corps advance base organization at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

"The equipment of each section should consist of two land aeroplanes, two sea aeroplanes, one school land aeroplane and two kite balloons, together with portable hangars, field repair shops, portable gas generating plant, supplies, etc.

"The personnel of each section should consist of seven officers, five enlisted men (qualified flyers) and twenty-six enlisted men (mechanics). The above personnel would provide for one officer and one enlisted man (qualified flyer) for each aeroplane, four enlisted mechanics for each aeroplane, one officer as observer for each kite balloon and one enlisted man as balloon man for each kite balloon, four enlisted men for motor

repair work and miscellaneous duties in connection with the section.

"All officers and enlisted men before flying in the Marine Corps should be required to qualify at the Pensacola Aeronautic Station, the former as Naval Aviators, the latter as Quartermasters (Aeroplane). The two Marine Corps officers recently detailed to take the course of instruction at the Army Aviation School will, when qualified as military aviators, be fitted to instruct other Marine officers and enlisted men in land flying. Such instruction to be carried out at the base at which the first advanced base organization is located.

"All aeronautic material used by the Marine Corps should be purchased from the Navy Aeronautic Appropriation and shall be lent to the Marine Corps. Since no General Account of Advances exists in the Marine Corps, it will be necessary to draw from store and charge against the Aeronautic Appropriation all aeronautic supplies for the Marine Corps. These supplies can be taken up on the Marine Corps books in the same way as other material lent by the Navy.

"The repair facilities incorporated in the aeronautic section of the organization should only be for such repairs as would be normally effected in the field. If the location of the organization is such that any Navy Yard shops are available for repairs, the question of having major repairs effected at these shops can be taken up.

"It is probable that as soon as sufficient personnel of the Marine Corps has been trained and as soon as sufficient money becomes available for the purchase of required material, the second advanced base organization will be similarly equipped with an aeronautic section.

"It is desired that the affairs of the advanced base organization aeronautic section be administered by Marine Corps Headquarters. Whatever organization for Aeronautics exists in the Navy Department will assume only general supervision over the aeronautic affairs in the Marine Corps, except that the various bureaus concerned will be directly responsible for the supply of aeronautic material to the Marine Corps in accordance with plans approved by the Department."

On July 5, 1916, among several recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, concerning Marine Corps aviation for advanced base operations, Major-General Commandant Barnett included: that "the advanced base force be equipped with an aeronautic unit composed of four water machines, two land machines, two kite balloons, and one school land machine;" that the personnel would be a "force of ten officers and forty men;" that "the aeronautic unit serve with the advanced base force of the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa., for the purpose of training officers and men as pilots and observers and developing proper tactics;" that "Marine officers and enlisted men regularly detailed in the aeronautic service be trained at the Navy Aeronautic Station;" that "one Marine officer out of every four qualifying at the Navy Aeronautic Station be sent to an Army Flying School to learn land flying;" that it was considered that "not less than two kite balloons should be provided," and that "for other work in the Marine Corps, such as landings, drives into the interior (as in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico, etc.) and to supple-

ment the water machines in base defense, at least two land machines should be provided."

"In July of 1916 the old pushers (seaplanes) were blown away in a hurricane at Pensacola and were replaced by N9's, which were similar in type to our present standard type training planes," explained one of our Ancient Aviators.

After this storm, Lieutenant Geiger qualified as a free and kite balloon pilot. For the remainder of his tour at Pensacola he was an instructor in lighter-than-air in addition to training on airplanes.

Lieutenant Evans, at Pensacola, on July 12, 1916, reported that during the quarter ending June 30, 1916, he had "made 187 flights in hydro-aeroplanes and flying boats."

On August 1, 1916, Lieutenant Cunningham submitted to the Major-General Commandant for his approval, a proposed initial personnel organization for the proposed Marine Corps flying station at Philadelphia. At San Diego, on August 29, 1916, Lieutenant Cunningham wrote the Major-General Commandant that he had "noted that the Advanced Base Aeronautic Unit has been specified and approved, which is certainly gratifying." Lieutenant Cunningham recommended that the "Aeronautic Station for the Advanced Base at Philadelphia be opened for duty April 1, 1917." He had "worked out plans for the hangars, flying fields, etc., at Philadelphia" and requested that he "be ordered there at least two months before the aviation station is to open so that" he could "superintend the building of the hangars, runways, floats and preparing the flying field."

Captain Francis T. Evans, on August 30, 1916, then in charge of the Marine Aviation Detachment at the Navy Aeronautic Station, Pensacola, wrote the Major-General Commandant that "at present there are only two enlisted men here under orders for instruction in flying: First Sergeant Jacob Makohin and Gunnery Sergeant W. E. McCaughtry." Evans wrote that in his letter to the Major-General Commandant of August 17, 1916, he had named twelve men that he desired sent to Pensacola for instruction. Evans recommended that Sergeants W. T. Crawford and M. Ransberger be issued orders for instruction in flying. The Major-General Commandant answered Evans on September 12, 1916, stating that the recommendations that Sergeants William T. Crawford and McKendree Ransberger be issued orders for instruction in flying should be made to the Commandant of the Aeronautic Station at Pensacola, etc. In this letter the Major-General Commandant wrote that "an aviation unit composed of forty enlisted men will be incorporated in the tables of authorized complement of Marine Corps organizations." One First Sergeant, 6 Gunnery Sergeants (technical), 8 Sergeants (technical) 10 Corporals (technical) and 15 privates.

The Marines on duty at the Navy Aeronautic Station, Pensacola, on September 30, 1916, were: First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham, First Lieutenant Bernard L. Smith (Assistant to Naval Attache, Paris), First Lieutenant Francis T. Evans, First Lieutenant Roy S. Geiger, Second Lieutenant William M. McIlvain, and 24 enlisted men, whose names are as follows: First Sergeant Jacob Makohin; Gunnery Sergeant Walter E. McCaughtry; Sergeants Charles W. Christ, William T. Crawford, James F. Pettus, and

McKendree Ransberger; Corporals Walter F. Caster, Fay Crafton, Hermann T. Michelsen, Carl J. Morgenstern, Joseph H. Pence, Albert L. Speake, and Harry L. Wilson; Privates Ralph S. Alton, Russell Bethell, Harry T. Black, Henry K. Brooks, Fred L. Brown, Benjamin F. Chalmers, Gustav A. Hanson, Henry S. Mott, Jesse Sackheim, Theodore Savage, and Lindsay G. W. Smith.

On October 5, 1916, Major-General Commandant George Barnett wrote in his Annual Report: "Five officers and 18 enlisted men are now engaged in aviation duty. In the current naval appropriation bill a complete reorganization of the Naval Flying Corps was effected. As soon as a sufficient number of officers and men become available, the Marine Corps complement will be brought up to the number authorized. Aviation has made great strides in the present war, and has become of great importance to the military and naval services. By direction of the Department a Marine Corps aviation company, consisting of 10 officers and 40 enlisted men, will be organized for duty with the advanced base force at as early a date as practicable. This company will be trained in the use of both land and water machines. Two officers who have been trained in the use of seaplanes are now under instruction in the use of land planes at the Army Flying School, San Diego, California."

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, in his Annual Report to President Wilson, dated December 1, 1916, wrote: "The Aviation Base at Pensacola, which site was selected by a board of able naval officers, is rapidly being equipped. Cruisers are being fitted with catapults." Also that "there are now seventeen aeroplanes in active use by the Navy," and "there are on order sixty machines of various types which have not yet been completed and accepted." Further: "There are at present at the Pensacola Aviation Station nine officers qualified as naval aviators and sixteen officers under instruction. A new class consisting of twelve naval officers, eighty men; four Marine Officers and sixteen men; and two Coast Guard Officers and eight men is now about to be sent to the station. There are now also two Marine Officers receiving instruction in land-machine flying at the Army School at San Diego, Calif."

An article in the December, 1916, number of this Magazine by Lieutenant Cunningham contains the following: "The Marine Corps is, of course, keeping apace with the other services in this important work. At present we have three Navy Air Pilots, one Naval Aviator, one Student Naval Aviator, and eighteen enlisted men assigned to aviation duty. This is far short of the number authorized by the Navy Department, but failure to detail more officers and men is due to the very evident fact that we (the Corps) have already more duties to perform than we have officers and men to perform them."

On November 8, 1916, Rear Admiral J. M. Helm of the Commission on Navy Yards and Naval Stations wrote Major-General Commandant Barnett that: "The Commission requires the assistance of an expert aviator in the selection of aviation bases on the Pacific Coast. First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham, U. S. M. C., now on duty at the Signal Corps' Aviation School, San Diego, California, has been recommended to the Commission as being particularly well qualified to render this assistance; and the Commis-

sion understands that there is no other officer of the Navy or Marine Corps on the Pacific Coast who is qualified for this duty."

Accordingly, Lieutenant Cunningham received the following orders dated November 8, 1916:

"You are detailed for temporary duty in connection with the Commission on Navy Yards and Naval Stations. Upon the receipt of this order you will report by letter to the Chairman of the Commission, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., and upon the arrival of the Commission at Los Angeles, Calif., on or about the 24th instant, you will proceed to that place and report in person to the Chairman. You are authorized to correspond direct with the Commission."

Captain Cunningham completed this duty in January of 1917 and on the 24th of that month Rear-Admiral Helm wrote Major-General Commandant Barnett that: "Captain A. A. Cunningham, M. C., having been detached and ordered East, the Commission wishes to thank you for his services and to express its appreciation of Captain Cunningham's very valuable aid in the furtherance of its duties. He was so agreeable personally that each and every member regrets his departure."

Captain David L. S. Brewster was designated a Student Naval Aviator on January 15, 1917. He was designated Naval Aviator on July 5, 1917. His number is No. 55.

Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, on January 30, 1917, wrote General Barnett requesting that: "Captain A. A. Cunningham, U. S. M. C., be ordered to proceed to Philadelphia and report to the Commandant, Philadelphia Navy Yard, for temporary duty in connection with the establishment of an Aeronautic Advanced Base Unit at that place, and that upon completion of these duties he return to Washington."

On February 24, Admiral Benson wrote General Barnett that "it is desired that Captain A. A. Cunningham, U. S. M. C., when available, be ordered to proceed to Navy Yard, Philadelphia, and report to the Commandant and Commanding Officer, Marine Corps, for duty in connection with the establishment and equipment of the Advanced Base Aeronautics Unit at that place. It is desired that he be placed in charge of this unit if such detail meets with the approval of the Major General Commandant."

Captain Cunningham's orders, dated February 26, 1917, read: "You are detached, on the 28th instant, from the U. S. Navy Aeronautic Station, Pensacola, Fla., and from temporary duty at these Headquarters, and will proceed on aviation duty to the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa., and report to the Commandant and to the Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks for duty in connection with the establishment and equipment of the Aviation Company, Marine Corps Advanced Base Force, at that place, and as the officer detailed to command that organization."

On March 3, 1917, Captain Cunningham joined the Philadelphia Barracks for aviation duty in connection with the establishment and equipment of the Aviation Company, Marine Corps Advanced Base Force.

With reference to Marine Corps Aviation in Advanced Base work, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels in his Annual Report, December 1, 1917, wrote that "the advanced base training is going on at the Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, where the

troops are being exercised in the drills necessary for advanced base work, including infantry drill, heavy and light artillery, mining, signal drills of every variety, and aviation."

Captain Cunningham performed temporary duty, in March of 1917, under orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, "in connection with the selection of air station sites." In the following month he was detailed on "special additional duty in connection with the establishment of coastal air stations on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts."

The war in Europe caused many arguments among the pilots concerning the relative maneuverability of land and seaplanes. In fact a Naval Constructor is said

to have proved mathematically that the seaplane could not be looped or stunted. Lieutenant Evans, of the Marines, took exception to this opinion, and on February 13, 1917, took an N9 up alone three thousand feet over the center of the Bay at Pensacola and dove it and whip-stalled it several times trying out its response to controls at different speeds. He then looped the plane and made a rather good one. Lieutenant Evans figured that the spectators might think it an accident so he flew over in front of the station and looped again. He then threw his N9 into a spin, pulling out, headed into the wind, charged up nearly to the runway on his step before throttling down to an easy rest on the runway.



LIEUTENANT CUNNINGHAM IN THE ORIGINAL CURTISS PLANE

BOOK REVIEW

華語新捷徑

INTRODUCTORY MANDARIN LESSONS or HUA YU HSIN CHIEH CHING. By First Lieutenant James M. McHugh, U. S. Marine Corps. Published by Kelly & Walsh, Limited, Shanghai, China, 1931.

THE "HUA YU HSIN CHIEH CHING" or INTRODUCTORY MANDARIN LESSONS has been designed primarily to supply the beginner who plans to take up the study of the Chinese language with a textbook which will afford him a sound basis for further study, and also as a guide for the casual student who desires to acquire a slight knowledge of that mysterious language without delving too deeply into the subject.

Having this stated object in view, the author has arranged his subject matter in a graduated manner so as to give the student progression at an even pace. All of the characters and phrases in the book are such as are in daily use by the Chinese themselves, in other words it exemplifies Chinese as spoken by the Chinese themselves, and an effort has been made throughout the book by means of the translations and frequent notes to clarify many small problems of obscurity which often confuse the beginner in the study of Chinese.

To one having no knowledge of the written and spoken language of the Chinese the written text of the language appears to be an intricate puzzle and the spoken language a meaningless jargon. To clear up this at the very beginning the author analyses and describes the eight strokes in writing which in different combinations are used to form all of many Chinese written characters, and explains the four tones of the "Kuan Hua" which form the basis of the spoken language, in which intonation and pitch have such an immense influence.

The great difficulty encountered by most English speaking people in attempts to acquire a knowledge of the Chinese language is due to the fact that the language cannot be properly expressed by the use of the Roman alphabet, as the Wade system of romanization in common use was adapted to use by all foreigners and hence does not conform to the rules of phonetics used in the English language. As the author so emphatically insists, "the essential thing in learning Chinese pronunciation is to get it from a Chinese," advice by the way which applies with great reason to the acquisition of a speaking knowledge of every language.

The utilitarian character of the subjects treated in the book are indicated by a glance at the index which gives the subject matter of the text, as follows: Writing words, talks about pencils, pens and paper, money, books and speech, clocks, the calendar, visiting cards and the sun and moon, food, tea and tobacco,

the family, the weather, the seasons of the year, the business office, the reception room, the library, the kitchen, the bedroom and the bathroom, as well as the servants' quarters. The story of an accident and an article on traveling in the country, and such varied subjects as attending a farewell party, gambling, taking a Chinese meal, entertaining a friend and going to the theatre are employed to demonstrate the use of the Chinese language. In fact even the casual inspection of this interesting book by one with a most limited knowledge of the Chinese language will thoroughly impress one with the fact that a wide range of Chinese language, life and thought has been covered in the two hundred and fifty pages of carefully concentrated work.

Lieutenant McHugh was on duty with the Marine Battalion at the American Legation in Peking, China, during the years 1924 and 1925 and while carrying out these duties he devoted as much as possible of his hours to a study of the Chinese language and made considerable progress, but experience has shown that to acquire a real working knowledge of the language requires the assignment of an officer to duty as a language student at Peking for a term of several years.

However, Lieutenant McHugh had made such creditable progress in his studies of the language while performing regular military duty with the battalion that it was considered advisable to order him back to Peking for a special course in the study of Chinese. Accordingly he was assigned to this duty from January, 1927, to March, 1931, and during this time showed great aptitude in acquiring a knowledge of the spoken and written language of the Chinese Mandarin dialect.

The present book shows the good results of this study pursued by the author during a total of six years at Peking and it may be considered as ample return to the Government for the time so expended.

The book is particularly well adapted for the use of officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps on duty in China who may desire to acquire a preliminary knowledge of the Chinese language with a view to possible further study of a more advanced nature if occasion should offer. It is likewise equally well adapted for use by American or English nationals whose business pursuits or desire for travel and adventure may take them to China.

To those members of the naval and military services, and civilians as well, who may wish to pursue a study of the Chinese language in their own country in order to acquire a preliminary knowledge of the structure and nature of the language the book is very well suited, though it should be borne in mind that, as the author insists, "the essential thing in learning Chinese pronunciation is to get it from the Chinese."

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What the Burnside Laboratory Means to the Shooter

The removal of the du Pont ballistic laboratory from the Brandywine to a location adjoining the powder manufacturing plant at Carney's Point, New Jersey, will definitely prove of benefit to the shooter.

The laboratory, recently renamed Burnside Laboratory, is constantly working towards the development of new and better powders. As a result of the relocation of the laboratory, the management and technical staff of the manufacturing plant can keep in close touch with all experimental work, so that, when the preliminary work is completed and the new powder is being produced on a semi-works scale, under the supervision of the laboratory, the plant personnel can become thoroughly familiar with all stages of the process. As a result, when new powders are placed in actual production there will be no unnecessary delay in placing them in the hands of the public. Furthermore, the laboratory can keep in close contact with the plant when the latter goes into production.

The finished powder is first tested in the plant laboratory and then submitted to Burnside Laboratory for final approval. Should any results be obtained whereby the two laboratories disagree, retesting routine is expedited and test methods completely standardized. In assignment of lots of powder to suit the special conditions under which the powder is to be used, the ballistic laboratory and the producing plant can cooperate to secure, in the highest degree, the best powder for the purpose.

In the manufacture, testing and use of powder there is but one degree of care which is of any value and that is: . . .
ETERNAL VIGILANCE.



E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, Inc.

Smokeless Powder Department, Wilmington, Del.



Smokeless Shotgun Powders



*For information on Target-Shooting, write to National Rifle Association, Barr Bldg., Washington, D. C.;
on Trapshooting, to Amateur Trapshooting Association, Vandalia, Ohio, and on Skeet,
to National Skeet Association, 108 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Mass.*

